------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Friday, 27 August 2004, 08:08 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 08/26/2014 TAGS PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, BM, KN SUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE ASSEMBLY AND UNDERGROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN BURMA Classified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN FOR REASON 1.5 (A/C). Summary The report is one of many about alleged covert North Korean co-operation with Burma, which has repeatedly denied there are any North Koreans in the country. Key passage highlighted in yellow. 1. (S) SUMMARY: North Korean workers are reportedly assembling "SAM missiles" and constructing an underground facility at a Burmese military site in Magway Division, about 315 miles NNW of Rangoon, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX . This unsolicited account should not be taken as authoritative, but it tracks with other information garnered and reported via XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary. 2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX 3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX some 300 North Koreans are working at a secret construction site west of Mimbu, Magway Division, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains. (Comment: the number of North Koreans supposedly working at this site strikes us as improbably high. End comment.) The XXXXXXXXXXXX claims he has personally seen some of them, although he also reported they are forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and other "outsiders" are prohibited from entering. The XXXXXXXXXXXX was confident that XXXXXXXXXXXX had the ability to distinguish North Koreans from others, such as Chinese, who might be working in the area. The exact coordinates of the camouflaged site are not known, but it is reportedly in the vicinity of 20,00 N, 94,25 E. 4. (S) The North Koreans are said to be assembling "SAM missiles" of unknown origin. XXXXXXXXXXXX the North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced underground facility that is "500 feet from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above." He added that the North Koreans are "blowing concrete" into the excavated underground facility. 5. (S) The XXXXXXXXXXXX is supposedly engaged in constructing buildings for 20 Burmese army battalions that will be posted near the site. Of these, two battalions are to be infantry; the other 18 will be "artillery," according to this account. 6. (S) [XXXXXXXXXXXX 7. (S) COMMENT: The [XXXXXXXXXXXX second-hand account of North Korean involvement with missile assembly and military construction in Magway Division generally tracks with other information Embassy Rangoon and others have reported in various channels. Again, the number 300 is much higher than our best estimates of North Koreans in Burma, and exactly how the XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly came to see some of them personally remains unclear. Many details provided XXXXXXXXXXXX match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated, sources. 8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: We cannot, and readers should not, consider this report alone to be definitive proof or evidence of sizable North Korean military involvement with the Burmese regime. The XXXXXXXXXXXX description made no reference at all to nuclear weapons or technology, or to surface-to-surface missiles, ballistic or otherwise. XXXXXXXXXXXX This account is perhaps best considered alongside other information of various origins indicating the Burmese and North Koreans are up to something ) something of a covert military or military-industrial nature. Exactly what, and on what scale, remains to be determined. Post will continue to monitor these developments and report as warranted. McMullen ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002238 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR CHA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS SUBJECT: ROK REACTIONS TO DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES-DAY TWO REF: SEOUL 2211 Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). Rokg reaction ------------- 1. (C) xxxxx that despite its decision to suspend humanitarian aid to the DPRK, it would ship another 24,700 metric tons of fertilizer 6-7 July. This final shipment will complete the delivery to the North of the pledge of 350,000 metric tons South Korea made earlier this year. MOU officials have explained that the ROKG is proceeding with this shipment because it is a small, final portion of a pledged commitment. 2. (U) Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok on July 6 told the National Assembly Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Trade Committee that Seoul would hold inter-Korean ministerial talks set for July 11-14 in Busan as scheduled, adding that it was not consistent to urge the North to return to talks over its nuclear weapons programs but refuse to talk with the North itself. Lee said it was still important to limit Seoul's measures against the North to avoid further escalation on the Peninsula. 3. (C) The A/DCM xxxxx to verify the items above. In a frank exchange, A/DCM expressed disappointment that things appeared to be "business-as-usual," with the shipment of fertilizer this week and the holding of inter-Korean ministerials next week. This was sending the wrong signals to Pyongyang for its inexcusable behavior, A/DCM said. xxxxx replied that a lot of internal discussions had taken place, but that political-levels concluded that breaking off the dialogue was not wise because restarting it would be too costly and difficult. Moreover, the dialogue must be used to send a stern message to North Korea. Next week the ROK delegation would definitely make the point that Pyongyang's demand for an additional 100,000 tons of fertilizer and 500,000 tons of rice was threatened. Also, in response to the missile launches, xxxxx, Seoul had decided to cancel North-South military liaison officers' talks that were planned for July 7, which essentially meant that General Officers' talks would not be held as hoped. In addition, Seoul was holding back on approving new investment permits for the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). A/DCM encouraged xxxxx develop further measures and to publicize them (septel). 4. (U) Senior Secretary for National Security Suh Choo-suk said on the radio on July 6 that the ROKG has initially concluded that the DPRK's failed missile launch was due to a technical failure. He also defended the ROKG's reaction to the missile launches as quick and appropriate. 5. (U) ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong on July 6 told the National Assembly Defense Committee that the North might launch more missiles, citing an assessment of the equipment and groups going to and from the launch sites during DPRK preparations over the past two months. He also rejected the argument of an opposition lawmaker that there was a delay in the ROKG reaction to the launches. Separately, an unnamed senior official at the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly denied media reports that the DPRK was preparing to launch a second Taepodong II missile. . Political reaction ------------------ 6. (C) During a July 6 opposition Grand National Party (GNFriday, 27 August 2004, 08:08 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 08/26/2014 TAGS PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, BM, KN SUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE ASSEMBLY AND UNDERGROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN BURMA Classified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN FOR REASON 1.5 (A/C). Summary The report is one of many about alleged covert North Korean co-operation with Burma, which has repeatedly denied there are any North Koreans in the country. Key passage highlighted in yellow. 1. (S) SUMMARY: North Korean workers are reportedly assembling "SAM missiles" and constructing an underground facility at a Burmese military site in Magway Division, about 315 miles NNW of Rangoon, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX . This unsolicited account should not be taken as authoritative, but it tracks with other information garnered and reported via XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary. 2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX 3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX some 300 North Koreans are working at a secret construction site west of Mimbu, Magway Division, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains. (Comment: the number of North Koreans supposedly working at this site strikes us as improbably high. End comment.) The XXXXXXXXXXXX claims he has personally seen some of them, although he also reported they are forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and other "outsiders" are prohibited from entering. The XXXXXXXXXXXX was confident that XXXXXXXXXXXX had the ability to distinguish North Koreans from others, such as Chinese, who might be working in the area. The exact coordinates of the camouflaged site are not known, but it is reportedly in the vicinity of 20,00 N, 94,25 E. 4. (S) The North Koreans are said to be assembling "SAM missiles" of unknown origin. XXXXXXXXXXXX the North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced underground facility that is "500 feet from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above." He added that the North Koreans are "blowing concrete" into the excavated underground facility. 5. (S) The XXXXXXXXXXXX is supposedly engaged in constructing buildings for 20 Burmese army battalions that will be posted near the site. Of these, two battalions are to be infantry; the other 18 will be "artillery," according to this account. 6. (S) [XXXXXXXXXXXX 7. (S) COMMENT: The [XXXXXXXXXXXX second-hand account of North Korean involvement with missile assembly and military construction in Magway Division generally tracks with other information Embassy Rangoon and others have reported in various channels. Again, the number 300 is much higher than our best estimates of North Koreans in Burma, and exactly how the XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly came to see some of them personally remains unclear. Many details provided XXXXXXXXXXXX match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated, sources. 8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: We cannot, and readers should not, consider this report alone to be definitive proof or evidence of sizable North Korean military involvement with the Burmese regime. The XXXXXXXXXXXX description made no reference at all to nuclear weapons or technology, or to surface-to-surface missiles, ballistic or otherwise. XXXXXXXXXXXX This account is perhaps best considered alongside other information of various origins indicating the Burmese and North Koreans are up to something ) something of a covert military or military-industrial nature. Exactly what, and on what scale, remains to be determined. Post will continue to monitor these developments and report as warranted. McMullen P) leaders' meeting, the GNP criticized the ROKG for its "idle" approach to the DPRK missile launches and called for the resignation of all the security-related ministers. The GNP proposed a national investigation on the ROKG's reaction, proposed an "emergency National Assembly committee," and urged the ROKG to review its inter-Korean policies, including the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the Geumgang Tourism Project, and humanitarian assistance. xxxxx told xxxxx that all cash support to the DPRK should be stopped and that sending fertilizer north as missiles were being fired was "nonsensical." xxxxx predicted that the missile test could have a deciding effect on the July 11 GNP party chair selection, to replace xxxxx who stepped down last month. xxxxx said the lawmaker who could make people feel the most secure would be selected and hinted that Kang Jae-sup, with his more conservative prosecutor's background, might be the more attractive choice in light of the current situation. 7. (C) The spokesman for smaller opposition Democratic Party (DP)xxxxx stated that the ROKG should recognize the importance of closely coordinating with Washington and Tokyo and improve its crisis management system that the DP said failed to operate effectively. One Democratic Party staffer noted to poloff that the missile tests should be viewed as "a test" and nothing more. 8. (U) The progressive Democratic Labor Party (DLP) spokesman said xxxxx that the ROKG should maintain dialogue with the DPRK and prevent further DPRK provocations. At the same time, the ROKG should encourage Washington to negotiate directly with Pyongyang. 9. (C) Several Uri Party staffers told poloff that further assistance would be difficult due to the lack of popular support, but that aid already agreed upon should continue. One staffer noted that the tests put the Uri Party in a "difficult position" because they showed the ineffectiveness of the current engagement policy. The Uri Party echoed much of the GNP's frustration with the related ministers, but stopped short of calling for them to step down. A common theme also heard was that the ROK reaction to the tests was "by the manual" developed by the Uri Party and not late at all. . Press coverage -------------- 10. (U) ROK media reports on July 6 highlighted UNSC discussions, criticisms that Seoul was caught flat-footed, and speculations about DPRK motivations and prospects for inter-Korean relations. The Dong-A Ilbo, a moderate daily, criticized the ROKG government for responding too slowly, delivering a weaker announcement than Washington or Tokyo, and for poorly coordinating with the USG, which, the paper said, created the information lag. 11. (U) As to why the North launched the missiles, opinions ranged from (1) to get attention and negotiation leverage; (2) to use for internal purpose to demonstrate DPRK strength; and/or (3) for technical reasons to demonstrate DPRK missile achievement. The progressive Hankyoreh opined that the timing of the launch, on July 4, was special because it was the 34th anniversary of the North-South Joint Statement from 1972, and it was the U.S. Independence Day, suggesting that the DPRK was exhibiting brinkmanship and wanted to generate more attention. 12. (U) Press stories quoted some analysts who opined that North Korea might stand to gain from the launches. Kim Tae-hyo, a political scientist at Sungkyunkwan University, was quoted as saying that Kim Jong-il probably gambled that Beijing and Seoul would not change their stances and that this gamble was likely to pay off. Paik Hak-soon, a senior researcher at Sejong Institute, suggested that the DPRK launch was probably an effort to strengthen its position in the Six Party Talks because it was unsatisfied with proposed compensation for scrapping its nuclear programs. Peter Beck, Director of the International Crisis Group's Seoul office said that at most Seoul would probably only delay aid shipments, versus a real change in its current policies. . Dprk watchers caution against sanctions at symposium --------------------------------------------- ------- 13. (SBU) The prevailing sentiment among North Korea experts gathered at a July 6 symposium in Seoul on North Korean Development and International Cooperation was for all parties to exercise restraint in responding to the North Korean missile launches. 14. (SBU) Amb. Sun Jun-young, Professor at Kyungnam University and Former ROK Ambassador to the UN, said that the missile launches were the DPRK's "last card" and showed not its strength, but its weakness.xxxxx that the DPRK felt so pressured by U.S. banking sanctions that it felt compelled to show its might in some manner. xxxxx believed that it would be a mistake to punish DPRK with sanctions and that it would be a mistake for the ROKG to suspend ministerial discussions scheduled for July 11. The best decision, he said, would be to perhaps delay the meetings, but to keep lines of communication open. 15. (SBU) xxxxx that the Bush Administration's "neglect and containment policy" caused North Korea to break its moratorium on missile testing. xxxxx expressed concern that the launches would result in sanctions. According xxxxx, every time sanctions were applied to North Korea, the nuclear and missile situation became aggravated. He said that the missile launches were a signal from North Korea to the United States that it wanted direct negotiations. Kyungnam University Prof. Lim Eul-chul also said that the missile launches appeared to be a way of bringing the United States back to the negotiating table. It was North Korea's way of getting American attention, he shrugged. 16. (SBU)xxxxx that it would not be helpful to cut off assistance and contacts, particularly in a time of crisis. It would be important to keep channels of communication open in order to facilitate an exchange of positions. 17. (SBU) Visiting xxxxx that the best reaction to the launches would be to continue with business as usual. He said that to overreact would be to play into North Korea's expectations and fulfill its goal of seeking attention. By minimizing public reaction and continuing to seek opportunities for exchange and assistance, there would be greater possibility of making a long-term, positive impact. Also, imposing sanctions would only harm ordinary North Koreans, who had nothing to do with the missile launches. xxxxx advised at most a delay in engagement activity with the DPRK. 18. (SBU) xxxxx, likened the missile crisis to a cold winter before a warm spring. He criticized the USG for taking a harsh line toward North Korea and precipitating the current situation. But, he said, the situation could be salvaged if the USG provided a security guarantee and food to North Korea. This, he said, would initiate the process of separating the regime from its leaders.xxxxx said that imposing sanctions would be as effective as a dog barking outside a city's walls. It would be much better to use humanitarian aid like a Trojan Horse to start change from within. . Dprk tourism and kic unaffected by missile launches --------------------------------------------- ------ 19. (SBU) Hyundai Asan President Yoon Man-joon said during his keynote address at xxxxx that the launches have had no impact on Hyundai Asan's operations in North Korea. He said that of the 315 persons scheduled to tour North Korea's Mt. Geumgang xxxxx, there was only one cancellation. Noting that far more people usually canceled at the last minute because of personal reasons, Yoon said that people seemed determined to continue with their plans. Yoon added that there has been no abnormal investor activity with regard to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and predicted that investors who were planning to invest in KIC would probably delay their investments for a short time, but then push ahead with their original plans. xxxxx "political, not military, missiles" and predicted that travel and investment in the DPRK would remain stable. Vershbow ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Wednesday, 23 May 2007, 02:45 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001576 SIPDIS SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 11/26/2026 TAGS PREL, PREF, PGOV, KS, KN SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SHARES IDEAS ON DPRK INTERACTION Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY ------- 1. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Arranging an Eric Clapton concert in Pyongyang could also be useful, he said, given Kim Jong-il's second son's devotion to the rock legend. END SUMMARY. XXXXXXXXXXXX ---------------------------------- 2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX DOING BUSINESS IN THE DPRK -------------------------- 3. (C) For an outsider to get anything done in the DPRK, XXXXXXXXXXXX advised, it is necessary to get the DPRK's various institutions to cooperate. Each institution seems to have veto power, but none has the power to push anything forward. XXXXXXXXXXXX the only organizations that can really deliver are the military, which does not talk to anybody, or the Red Cross. XXXXXXXXXXXX DIVIDED FAMILIES INITIATIVE --------------------------- 4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX advocated in favor of USG involvement in facilitating the reunification of Korean-American families divided by the Korean War. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that currently two groups organize these visits for Korean-Americans. The first is Compatriots United, which has arranged thousands of reunions. However, the group is controlled by the DPRK's Overseas Compatriots Committee and extorts a tremendous amount of money from desperate families to arrange the visits. Families seeking to participate must pay USD 300 to apply and submit comprehensive personal and financial information. If selected, the families are forced to pay for unwanted sightseeing excursions in North Korea. Before they are finally able to see their relatives, which is always just hours before their departing flight, they are often told that the relatives had to travel to the meeting place by taxi and owed several thousand dollars in fare. As XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, these are desperate, old people who would pay anything. After the trip, the participants typically get repeated correspondence from the North Korean government asking for money to assist the family members, who are sometimes falsely alleged to be ill. 5. (C) The other group active in family reunions is Pyongtong in Los Angeles. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the group recently arranged for 15 persons to visit family members in the DPRK. However, the DPRK canceled the arrangement after the group went to the press. Pyongyang ultimately intervened and instructed the Compatriots Committee to help facilitate the visit. Thus, Pyongtong was able to arrange a visit for six people a few weeks ago. 6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea would not run such an exploitative system if the United States government were involved in the process. There is a reluctance, he said, for Korean-Americans to pursue family reunions because they do not want to divulge their personal information to the DPRK and they do not want the North Koreans to milk them for money before, during and after the reunion. The USG could at least volunteer to serve as a conduit for correspondence between these families and North Korea to prevent the DPRK from learning the home addresses and bank accounts of participants. The DPRK might be willing to accept this structure because it badly wants a relationship with Washington. XXXXXXXXXXXX ----------------------------- XXXXXXXXXXXX ------------------------ 8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX did not see hope for inter-Korean engagement, despite the widely acclaimed railroad test. "North Koreans have no intention of dealing with (South Koreans). The South Koreans really think they can help. They don't understand that North Korea is sealed." BOOK ERIC CLAPTON ----------------- 9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX passed on the suggestion from his North Korean interlocutors that the USG arrange for Eric Clapton to perform a concert in Pyongyang. As Kim Jong-il's second son, Kim Jong-chol, is reported to be a great fan, the performance could be an opportunity to build good will. VERSHBOW ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 09:48 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001141 SIPDIS SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 03/26/2033 TAGS PREL, PGOV, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, KN, CH, IR SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN, AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary ------- 1. (C) Current bilateral cooperation on arms control, nonproliferation and export control is "remarkable," MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye told Staffdel Januzzi March 24. Nevertheless, there is a "perception" that the United States counts on China's support on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust China as an equal partner. On Iran, China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via Security Council resolutions and focusing on the diplomatic front. China's cooperation with Iran on energy is unrelated to the Iran nuclear issue and Cheng "can't imagine" the consequences if Sinopec is sanctioned. On North Korea, Cheng urged the United States to find a creative resolution to the declaration issue. End Summary. 2. (C) Frank Januzzi and Puneet Talwar, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye March 24 to discuss Chinese views on arms control, non-proliferation, Iran and North Korea. "Remarkable" Cooperation ------------------------ 3. (C) Arms control, export controls and nonproliferation all contribute to China's security, said Cheng. A decade ago, cooperation between China and the United States focused on certain cases, but today's level of cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues is "remarkable," Cheng said. For example, China is actively involved in diplomatic negotiation efforts on North Korea and Iran. And in many areas of nonproliferation, said Cheng, the two countries see "eye-to-eye." He referred to multilateral agreements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and said that even if China is not a member of these various organizations, China has in place its own export control regime. For example, there is interagency coordination on sensitive exports as well as alleged proliferation cases raised by the United States. Cheng noted that while the pace of implementing arms control agreements has slowed in the past decade, China is prepared to move the disarmament conference forward within the United Nations framework. Equal Partners -------------- 4. (C) Cheng contended that there is a "perception" that the United States counts on China's support and cooperation on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust or treat China as an equal partner. For example, in the 1990s, China was invited to join the MTCR and the Australia Group but declined to join. Currently, however, China is "not welcome," despite expressing a willingness to join, Cheng said. China and the United States need to cooperate on a "mutual, equal basis." Cheng also raised the issue of sanctions against China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC has been subject to sanctions for ten years without "solid evidence," said Cheng. Over the past 3-4 years, CGWIC has restructured the company, changed its business model and prohibited contacts with countries of concern to the United States. Cheng expressed hope that the company would make progress during its March 20 meetings in Washington. Iran ---- 5. (C) Cheng said China and the United States share the same goal for Iran: no further proliferation of nuclear weapons. China makes this point very clearly to the international community and to Iran in the context of its private bilateral contacts. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Iranian leaders during his November visit to Iran that China is opposed to proliferation in the Middle East. China supports the UNSCRs on Iran and the P5-plus-1 process, emphasized Cheng. After the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and IAEA reports on Iran last year, there is a need for more diplomatic efforts, Cheng said. China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via UNSCRs and focusing on the diplomatic front. 6. (C) One of the dilemmas of the Iran nuclear issue is that despite three UNSCRs, Iran's capability to enrich uranium BEIJING 00001141 002 OF 002 continues to expand, Cheng underscored. China and other countries need to be "creative" in devising a proposal "attractive" to Iran. The international community must find a way to ensure its concerns about Iran's nuclear development are addressed and promote the peaceful development of nuclear energy, maintained Cheng. Cheng reasoned that if incentives do not work, then it will make applying pressure easier in the future because it shows that diplomacy was not effective. The P5-plus-1 meeting in Shanghai in April will allow the ministers to discuss strategy on next steps. Cheng noted that a recent proposal from the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) includes some interesting ideas and that his office is in the process of studying its proposal. Cheng said that Germany has put forward a proposal to "refresh" previous offers. China believes that the P5-plus-1 will need to offer new incentives to Iran. 7. (C) Iran might be more willing to offer a reciprocal positive gesture on the nuclear issue if it does not feel threatened by regime change, Cheng said. Regarding Iran's claim that it did not have a nuclear program prior to 2003, China is not in a position to comment without presentation of evidence and materials, Cheng said. China continues to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and encourages the IAEA to play a greater role. Cheng also discussed possible incentives for Iran after international confidence is restored, including reinstatement as a non-nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member, education cooperation, normalization of economic relations, etc. China-Iran Energy Cooperation ----------------------------- 8. (C) Regarding China-Iran energy cooperation, Cheng believes that there is a "misunderstanding" on the part of the United States. China has made clear its need for energy resources and has previously stated that its cooperation with Iran on energy has nothing to do with the Iran nuclear issue. China hopes that the U.S. Congress understands this point, said Cheng. Specifically, the threat of sanctions against Sinopec is a very serious issue, Cheng emphasized. Sinopec is very important to China and Cheng "can't imagine" the consequences if the company is sanctioned. Januzzi noted Cheng's concerns and said that he would pass this message to Washington. North Korea ----------- 9. (C) Januzzi recounted his meetings with DPRK counterparts during his five-day trip to North Korea and said that he encouraged them to provide a declaration. Cheng said that China does not have specific information on North Korea's alleged purchase of centrifuge technology and that China had received this information from the United States. He urged the United States to focus on the future and not to dwell on the past. The United States is not interested in delving into North Korea's past, Januzzi countered. The United States needs to have clarity on certain issues, however, in order to move forward. According to Cheng, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei urged the DPRK to take advantage of this unique opportunity. The resolution of the declaration issue will require some imagination and creativity, Cheng said. North Korea does not fully trust the United States and remains concerned about admitting to an activity it claims never existed, Cheng claimed. 10. (U) Staffdel Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. PICCUTA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 12 January 2009, 09:12 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000059 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2019 TAGS PGOV, PREL, KS, KN SUBJECT: ROK'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE NEIGHBORS: NORTH KOREA, JAPAN, CHINA AND RUSSIA REF: A. TOKYO 3114 (TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING) B. SECDEF DTG261447ZNOV08 (DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS) C. TOKYO 3416 (ROK-PRC-JAPAN TRILATS) D. SEOUL 1681 (ROKG ON CHINA) E. SEOUL 1700 (ROK-PRC SUMMIT) F. SEOUL 2461 (ROK-RUSSIA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE) Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) 1. (C) Summary: As a presidential candidate, Lee Myoung-bak called for a "creative reconstruction" of Korea's foreign policy. In his February 2008 inaugural address, Lee criticized his two predecessors, saying, "At times over the last ten years, we found ourselves faltering and confused." He vowed to trade ideology for pragmatism as Korea's surest means of improving ties with its neighbors, and he's had some successes, especially with China and Russia, where Lee was able to expand substantially economic and political ties. Lee's efforts on Japan and North Korea are more mixed. With Japan, the South Korean public was not quite ready to accept fully Lee's attempts to compartmentalize history issues. Still, much progress was made in Seoul-Tokyo consultations on a variety of issues ranging from North Korea to economic to even security issues. On North Korea, Lee's conservative agenda was predictably rebuffed by Pyongyang. However, all signs are that President Lee is quite comfortable in sticking to denuclearization and reciprocity as the basis of his North Korea policy, especially as it enjoys considerable support. End Summary. ---- DPRK ---- 2. (C) In a February 2007 speech that has widely come to be known as the "MB Doctrine," presidential candidate Lee Myung-bank firmed up his vision of his administration's North Korea Policy. Lee said his first priority would be to abolish what he described as his predecessors' "unprincipled and unilateral policy of appeasement" toward the DPRK and replace it with a policy that offered generous assistance in exchange for North Korea's complete nuclear dismantlement and Pyongyang's accommodation of South Korea's desire for family reunion, accounting of welfare and whereabouts of POWs from the Korean War and several hundred abductees after the war. Immediately upon taking office, the Lee Administration also made it clear that it would review all commitments from the two South-North summits -- June 2000 and October 2007. Senior Lee Administration officials complained publicly that the October 2007 summit between Kim Jong-il and President Roh Moo-hyun was arranged by Roh to favor the progressive candidate in the presidential election two months later and that therefore President Lee was not bound to fulfill promises amounting to billions of dollars of aid to the North. 3. (C) The response from Pyongyang was predictably swift and severe. Using threatening language not heard since the Kim Young-sam days, North Korea has moved step by step to cut off inter-Korean relations. Initially, all inter-Korean meetings were cancelled, with the North loudly proclaiming that food aid from the South was neither needed nor wanted. Thereafter, Pyongyang implemented a draconian restriction in December of North-South cross-border traffic, stopping Kaesong tourism and severely limiting traffic to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. As the Kumgang tourism had been stopped by the South over the July shooting death of a Southern tourist, the net result has been a crippling blow to the KIC and Kumgang tourism, the two proudest results of the Sunshine policy. 4. (C) With both sides dug in, the outlook for any quick improvement in inter-Korean relations is slim to none. Much more likely is the continued "psychological war," as characterized by Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan in his recent meeting with the Ambassador. President Lee is determined not to give in to North Korean pressure. Our Blue House contacts have told us on several occasions that President Lee remained quite comfortable with his North Korea policy and that he is prepared leave the inter-Korean relations frozen until the end of his term in office, if necessary. It is also our assessment that Lee's more conservative advisors and supporters see the current standoff as a genuine opportunity to push and further weaken the North, even if this might involve considerable brinkmanship. Also favoring the Lee Administration's stance is the the Korean public, which is calm to the point of apathy about the inter-Korean situation. ----- Japan ----- 5. (C) President Lee has made concerted efforts to improve relations with Tokyo, which were significantly strained during the Roh Moo-hyun era over history and territory issues. Lee sought to compartmentalize what he called "disputes over the past", stating in an early policy address that "South Korea and Japan should...try to foster a future-oriented relationship with a pragmatic attitude. Historical truth must not be ignored, but we can no longer afford to give up our future relations due to disputes over the past." Lee's vision was to look beyond the history-bound bilateral issues and create a Korea-Japan partnership active in the regional and global arena on issues like the denuclearization of the DPRK, strengthening of multilateral relationships, trade and economics, and cooperation on projects like alternative energy, communicable diseases, and poverty alleviation. 6. (C) So far, Lee's efforts have yielded some success, although Blue House officials would argue that results would have been far better had Tokyo shown more courage, especially in dealing with the Takeshima/Dokdo issue. For example, Lee pressed ahead with his plan to engage Japan on a more strategic regional and global level. Lee made the decision that Korea would participate in the October U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Policy Planning talks (Ref A) in Tokyo. He then agreed to the U.S.-Japan-Korea Defense Trilateral Talks (Ref B) in Washington in November, the first trilateral defense talks in six years. Lee also initiated the first ever stand-alone China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit (Ref C) in Fukuoka in December. Critics will of course point out that there were no substantive results from these meetings, but the fact that the meetings were held at all is a significant result. ----- China ----- 7. (C) President Lee has openly courted the Chinese, and he has chalked up some noteworthy successes. Less than one year into his term, Lee has already met with PRC President Hu Jintao three times, quite unprecedented in the history of ROK-PRC relations (Ref D); typically, in the past, the ROK could expect only one visit in a PRC president's ten-year term. Lee paid his first state visit to Beijing in May 2008 and met Hu again in August when Lee traveled to Beijing for the Olympics. Hu paid a state visit to Seoul August 25-26. President Lee made the relations seem a two-way desire. A Chinese Embassy contact told us that Beijing had been concerned that China-Korea relations would suffer because of the emphasis Lee wanted to put on improving U.S.-Korea relations. Therefore, China was pleasantly surprised that Lee was able to improve both bilateral relationships simultaneously. Kim Heung-kyu, Professor of Chinese Security and Foreign Policy at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Lee had effectively leveraged the U.S.-Korea relationship to improve relations with China, which is eager for closer ties with Korea to check U.S. and Japanese interests in the region. 8. (C) During Lee's first visit to Beijing, he and Hu issued a joint statement which upgraded the Korea-China relationship to a "strategic cooperative partnership". Our Chinese Embassy contact gave the clearest explanation of what was now "strategic" about the ROK-PRC relationship: that China's nomenclature to describe its relations with Korea was upgraded according to a roughly five-year schedule. In 1992, relations were normalized; in 1998, the first year of Kim Dae-jung's term as President, the Chinese upgraded the relationship to "cooperative partnership"; in 2002, it was upgraded again to "comprehensive cooperative partnership," and now it is "strategic cooperative partnership." 9. (C) Despite the name, Koreans have found substantive strategic discussions with the Chinese frustratingly difficult. For example, Lee, unlike his immediate predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, added North Korean human rights to the Korea-China summit agenda in August, asking Hu not to repatriate North Korean refugees against their will. Hu did not respond to Lee's request (Ref E). Also, we understand, Lee asked Hu what China thought about the North Korean domestic political situation and whether Beijing had any contingency plans. This time, Hu apparently pretended not to hear Lee. Still, the ROK did not come away empty, because, despite initial Chinese objections, Lee was successful in including in the summit joint statement a commitment "to promote dialogue and cooperation in the field of international human rights." ------ Russia ------ 10. (C) Lee has largely continued the trend of his predecessors in upgrading economic ties with Russia. ROK-Russia economic ties have grown more than 40% annually for the past three years, with two-way trade exceeding USD 15 billion in 2007. Much of the growth is due to Russia's natural resources. For example, Lee paid a state visit to Moscow in September and agreed to a contract for Russia to supply Korea with 7.5 million tons of natural gas annually for thirty years beginning from 2015, amounting to an estimated 20% of Korea's annual natural gas consumption. And despite doubts about North Korea's cooperation, Lee agreed in principle to Russia exploring plans for a pipeline through North Korea to deliver the gas. The two countries also agreed to investigate the possibilities for linking the inter-Korean railway to the trans-Siberian railway system (Ref F). 11. (C) On his state visit, Lee also signed an agreement to upgrade the ROK-Russia relationship to a "Strategic Cooperative Partnership", the same term used by China to describe this year's upgrade to the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko Jae-nam, of MOFAT's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Korea proposed using the term "Strategic Cooperative Partnership" after China used the term to describe the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko said Korea's objective in using the same terminology to describe the ROK-Russia relationship was to balance the ROK-PRC relationship. ------- Comment ------- 12. (C) During a year in which President Lee faced considerable difficulty advancing his domestic agenda, his foreign policy efforts, if not wildly successful, at least did not get him into trouble. To a considerable degree, relations with South Korea's neighbors are driven by economic realities -- increased regional trade, investment, and tourism -- that mesh with Lee's pragmatic, non-ideological approach. Relations with North Korea were the outlier, as the DPRK took pains in 2008 to demonstrate that it could live without ROK assistance. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 27 April 2009, 06:35 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 04/27/2019 TAGS PGOV, KN, KS SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile military rhetoric over the last several months are related to the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to Colonel Lee Sang-chul, Ministry of National Defense North Korea Policy Division Director and lead ROKG representative to Colonel-level military-to-military talks in October 2008. A second priority was to achieve improved relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY. ------------------------------- Military Statements and the NDC ------------------------------- 2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, Lee told Poloff that the Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level announcements over the past several months (such as the March 8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military asserting control over the country, because the military could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression." There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG was not particularly worried about the specific threats to the South contained in the statements because they saw the statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were to resort to military action, rather than giving warning. 3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008 stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed stronger leadership." Lee said that before the stroke, KJI was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly succession, though Lee did not claim to know who was next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of KJI's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that would pave the way for succession. 4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from 8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had the lead on succession, Lee believed. KJI brother-in-law Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for succession preparation, not only because he was married to KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall 2008 recovery period. 5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who Lee thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and special operations institutions under his control at NDC. One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department, which Oh has headed since 1989. (Lee also referred to an April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that "Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control, saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the succession period. Lee said he believed that changes to the DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a "strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in. 6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would prevent it from achieving surprise, so Lee was reassured that no direct military provocation was imminent. ----------------------- Relations with the U.S. ----------------------- 7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the above situation, Lee answered indirectly, saying that the main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S., because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security and economic problems. Lee said this push for improved relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S. as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities' agenda. Lee said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress; and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue. 8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. Lee was convinced that the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal steps. Like other ROKG officials, Lee emphasized the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues related to North Korea. 9. (C) Lee cautioned that China would seek to prevent U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S., China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK nuclear weapon test. ----------- Mt. Kumgang ----------- 10. (C) As an aside, Lee commented on the July 2008 shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed, so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those exercise periods. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Wednesday, 29 April 2009, 13:30 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001108 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 04/29/2019 TAGS PREL, RU, UNSC, KNNP, KN SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SIX PARTY NEGOTIATOR URGES PATIENCE ON NORTH KOREA Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Summary. Amidst escalating threats from Pyongyang in response to UN Security Council actions against its April 5 missile launch, Russian Ambassador-at-Large for Six-Party Talks Grigoriy Logvinov during an April 28 meeting urged the U.S. and the other Six-Party partners to remain patient. Reporting that Foreign Minister Lavrov had a difficult trip to North Korea that did not reveal any flexibility in DPRK's position, he assessed that Pyongyang was hunkering down for a succession crisis, while seeking to use Yongbyon's disablement reversal as a bargaining chip for further concessions in the Six-Party talks. Lamenting that no one had good ideas on how to pull North Korea back from its brinkmanship, Logvinov asked for additional consultations with the U.S., particularly on the time it would take for Pyongyang to reassemble its plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In Logvinov's view, the Six-Party partners should use the intervening time to engage in quiet diplomacy to persuade North Korea to return to the negotiating table, though it is possible that we may have to wait until the succession crisis has passed before seeing a softening of North Korea's position. End Summary. A Rough Trip ------------ 2. (C) In an April 28 meeting, Ambassador-at-Large Grigoriy Logvinov characterized Foreign Minister Lavrov's April 23-24 trip to Pyongyang as "rough." Logvinov conveyed that the North Korean leadership was "very angry" and told Lavrov categorically that it was resolved to restart its nuclear program, would never participate in the Six-Party Talks again, and would not trust anything but nuclear deterrence as its security guarantee. In contrast to his 2004 trip, Lavrov did not get a meeting with Kim Jong-Il. Logvinov speculated that the reason could be due to either Kim's poor health or North Korean displeasure at the GOR's support for the UNSC Presidential Statement and sanctions. 3. (C) Indicating that FM Lavrov would be sending personal letters to his Six-Party counterparts regarding his trip, Logvinov urged the U.S. to show patience and not overreact to the latest developments. In his view, Pyongyang's hard line position was either a negotiating tactic or an indication that a power transition was near, but in any case did not represent the final word on the denuclearization issue. Referring directly to Japan, Logvinov warned that if countries were to press for additional UNSC action, it would only provoke the DPRK into further brinkmanship and prove counterproductive. Wait Out the Succession Crisis ------------------------------ 4. (C) Elaborating on his assessment that a power transition was near, Logvinov hypothesized that Pyongyang was being particularly intransigent because it wanted to demonstrate strength to the outside world and mask the power struggle occurring internally. Recalling the political instability around the time of Stalin and Mao's deaths, he indicated Moscow understood the possible fallout of a North Korean succession scenario because "we have seen this before." While noting that Kim Jong-Il appeared to be functioning, if impaired, Logvinov speculated that as long as the "Dear Leader" was technically alive, he could remain the face of a charismatic leadership. Others, whether it's his son or brother-in-law, could wield the power behind the scenes. Should Kim die, however, these people would have to emerge from the shadows and establish their own authority to rule, in which case the situation could become quite unstable. According to Logvinov, the GOR did not have a clear picture of the role the North Korean military would play in a succession crisis, nor did it know what importance to attach to the increased prominence of the military in the official press. Logvinov mused that a collective leadership arrangement might be a more stable option during a North Korean succession scenario. 5. (C) In Logvinov's personal view, nothing was likely to induce North Korea to abandon its current course and return to the negotiating table until the succession crisis passed. The only thing the Six-Party partners could do in the meantime, he stressed, was to wait out the power transition MOSCOW 00001108 002 OF 003 while preventing Pyongyang from further wrongdoing. The previous goals of completing a verification protocol and finishing Phase II as soon as possible were unachievable for the time being. Or Wait Until DPRK Restarts Yongbyon ------------------------------------ 6. (C) Logvinov did not rule out the possibility that North Korea, in an attempt to "sell" its nuclear capabilities a third time, would seek negotiations once it reversed the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The GOR hoped that Pyongyang's stated intention to restart plutonium reprocessing was a negotiating ploy, rather than a real determination to reopen its nuclear program. In Logvinov's view, the DPRK's dire economic situation was affecting the military programs despite the disproportionate share of resources poured into them. Derisively calling the missile the North Koreans tested "a piece of junk that miraculously flew," he wondered if Pyongyang truly had the capability to restart reprocessing plutonium given Yongbyon's dilapidated condition. Recalling the estimate by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would take the North Koreans three to six months to reverse fully Yongbyon's disablement, Logvinov asked for consultations with U.S. experts on a more definitive assessment of time frame, stating that the Six-Party partners should use the intervening period to engage in quiet diplomacy to pull Pyongyang back from brinkmanship. 7. (C) Should the North Koreans decide to seek negotiations after reversing disablement, Logvinov saw several complications ahead. First, Pyongyang would likely demand a higher price for resuming the Six-Party Talks, which in his view could include a light water reactor and the exclusion of Japan from the talks as punishment for Tokyo's high profile role in pressing for UNSC action. Even the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia could be among the DPRK conditions. Second, the Six Party partners should not agree to be blackmailed that way, especially with regard to paying again for Yongbyon's disablement, and would need to secure DPRK agreement to restart from where the process had left off. Third, Pyongyang's disablement reversal would be a clear violation of UNSCR 1718. Whether the Security Council should take action would be an awkward question, as doing so could provide North Korea into further belligerent action. And lastly, North Korea's blatant disregard of the principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) posed challenges to efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime as the international community prepared for next year's NPT review conference. No One Knows What to Do ----------------------- 8. (C) In Logvinov's view, none of the Six-Party partners currently had good ideas on ways forward. He shared that during Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's just concluded April 26-27 visit to Moscow, the Russian and Chinese sides discussed North Korea in general without putting forward specific proposals. Lavrov and Yang reaffirmed their common positions on the need for patience and restraint, and agreed that the Six-Party Talks must continue. Similarly, the MFA had prepared briefing material on North Korea for Prime Minister Putin's May 11 trip to Japan, but it too "contained nothing special." One prerequisite for jump starting the negotiations again, in Logvinov's view, was the Six-Party readiness to fulfill immediately the Phase II economic assistance obligations. 9. (C) Logvinov stressed the importance the MFA placed on consultations with the U.S. on North Korea, and in this regard expressed appreciation for Ambassador Sung Kim's phone call last week that helped him to provide FM Lavrov a fuller brief for his Pyongyang trip. While welcoming a possible visit by Special Envoy Bosworth to Moscow in the next week, he asked that the U.S. come prepared with proposals or views on the next steps. "We shared our views in Seoul. Now we are ready to hear from our American friends," he stated, referring to the March 7 initial meeting between Ambassador Bosworth and Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin in South Korea. He also expressed the view that should the Six-Party partners succeed in persuading North Korea to return to the talks, the U.S. should not continue to insist on completing a MOSCOW 00001108 003 OF 003 verification protocol as it would be untimely given the changed circumstances. BEYRLE ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Thursday, 30 April 2009, 13:07 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034 TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS, JA, IR, PK, AF SUBJECT: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE DISCUSSES G-20, DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- 1. (C) Taiwan's participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on "one China, very broadly interpreted," Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d'Affaires. In his capacity as G-20 Sherpa, VFM He said he would ask for appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit. VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the "bold steps" taken by Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, VFM He asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that "non-lethal" is a broad and vague term. 2. (S) Summary Continued: VFM He raised concerns over China's "core interests" of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could "derail" bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human rights cases, to which VFM He replied with standard language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; VFM He promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained American journalists; VFM H said China would. VFM He expressed concern over building "momentum" on UNSC reform and asked the United States not to be "proactive" on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other's practical needs including residential leases and asked for VFM He's assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary. TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA -------------------------- 3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was "one step forward" toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through consultations based on "one China, very broadly interpreted," Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d'Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were "improving," and as they did, China hoped the United States would feel "less burdened, frustrated and nervous," VFM He said. The Charge congratulated VFM He on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase mutual trust. IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS ------------------------------- 4. (C) The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead's visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between our two militaries forward. VFM He agreed that State Councilor Liu Yandong's visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been productive. VFM He said Liu came away "very impressed" by her interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to "follow up" on the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of both countries. 5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department BEIJING 00001176 002 OF 005 Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. VFM He replied that the visit of Li, a "future leader of China," was "very important," so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged VFM He to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi's visit as a type of "state visit," VFM He replied. Nevertheless, given her "tight schedule," the Speaker would likely "not have time" to visit Tibet, VFM He said. 6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year, VFM He noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind, both sides should be "careful" and act in ways that benefit the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President's visit to China in mind. G-20: DATES AND TOPICS ----------------------- 7. (C) VFM He stated that, he would ask to meet with NSC's Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda. 8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, VFM He noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, VFM He felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China "troika" had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans. 9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to VFM He, had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman: A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery; B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not "break their promises as soon as they returned home"; C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). 10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, VFM He stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in "destabilizing the system." The system, however, was "not perfect and needs reform." He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further, VFM He suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, VFM He noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change. 11. (U) Note: VFM He's comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel. VFM HE'S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK --------------------------------------------- BEIJING 00001176 003 OF 005 12. (C) VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, VFM He hoped to hold "informal consultations" in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a "spoiled child" in order to get the attention of the "adult." China therefore encouraged the United States, "after some time," to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, VFM He observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, VFM He said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce Pyongyang's bad behavior. 13. (C) VFM He also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the "bold steps" taken by Washington. China had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab countries "jittery," VFM He said, this should be a matter the United States could "manage." What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in the region again. 14. (C) VFM He said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors' Conference, China still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, VFM He said China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the proposed route, noting that "non-lethal" is a broad and vague term. TIBET AND TAIWAN AS "CORE INTERESTS" ------------------------------------ 15. (C) VFM He raised concerns over China's "core interests" of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could "derail" bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard "rumors" that the Dalai Lama would attend a "seminar" in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was "likely" to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, VFM He said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to "take care" of each other's "core interests." When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as "obstacles" or as "core interests." It did not matter whether one side "liked or disliked" such matters; rather, in a "mature, close and important" bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, VFM He asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to "step down" over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama. 16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China's defining Tibet as a "core issue" with the apparent expectation that others would "step back." Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans' legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama's representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated. BEIJING 00001176 004 OF 005 17. (C) Another issue that could "derail" relations was arms sales to Taiwan, VFM He said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible "very important" and "potent" arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a "very serious issue" for China, AFM He said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan. HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG --------------------------------------- 18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. VFM He replied that, as a sign of the "maturity" of our bilateral relationship, he had "repeatedly" listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled "according to law" and in accordance with China's legal/judicial system. Such cases were "sensitive" and should be handled "carefully," VFM He said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases "to the extent possible." NORTH KOREAN "GUESTS" --------------------- 19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for VFM He's assistance in doing so. VFM He said he would look into the matter. U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK --------------------------------- 20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. VFM He replied that the United States could "rest assured" that China would do so. UNSC REFORM ----------- 21. (C) China was concerned by "momentum" that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was "not good" for the P-5, VFM He said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be "proactive" on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 "club" should not be "diluted," VFM He said. If we end up with a "P-10," both China and the United States would "be in trouble." Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget. COCA II: AVOIDING A "TRADE WAR" -------------------------------- 22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked VFM He to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in BEIJING 00001176 005 OF 005 Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. VFM He said this situation sounded like a "trade war." The Charge asked VFM He to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle. VFM He said he believed real progress had been made and differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not want a "trade war" over COCA II issues. He pledged to "look into" the matter. PICCUTA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08 S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529 EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029 TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH, KN SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MAY 30, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore. 2. (SBU) Participants: United States ------------- The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker) SINGAPORE --------- Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA 3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee's views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma's answer was that "they can survive on their own." The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well "go nuclear." MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary. China and North Korea --------------------- 4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee's views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated. 5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma's Delphic answer was that "they can survive on their own." MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China's interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth. 6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea's decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well "go nuclear." The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK's current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said. 7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a "flabby old chap" for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine. 8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is "nothing there" in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said. Chinese Economy --------------- 9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said. 10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore's 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said. Taiwan ------ 11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said. 12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma's positions on the '92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan's leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said. 13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan's economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan's South need China's market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan's continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing's calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan "back to China," even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan. Xi Jinping ---------- 14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang's influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes. Wang Qishan ----------- 15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee's meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee's thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man. China's Rise ------------ 16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series "The Rise of Great Powers." The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China's economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China's close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated. 17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma. Build Ties with Young Chinese ----------------------------- 18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China's young people. China's best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America's advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China's leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted. 19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message. Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm SHIELDS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Friday, 24 July 2009, 07:38 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001171 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 07/24/2019 TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, KN, KS SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH ROK UNIFICATION MINISTER HYUN IN-TAEK Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 20 meeting, Unification Minister Hyun In-taek outlined Kim Jong-il's health and succession concerns, key figures and the current state of the DPRK for A/S Campbell. Although Kim Jong-il (KJI) remained firmly in control of the regime for now, he was unlikely to live beyond 2015. On succession, Hyun observed the current succession preparations for Kim Jung-un were "rushed," and anticipated additional "fireworks" (either a third nuclear test or missile launches) at the end of the current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-October. North Korea would return to dialogue afterwards. North Korea is suffering from severe food shortage and devastating economic crisis caused by lack of foreign aid, economic foundation and decent harvest. The situation is worse than the 1996/ 1997 crisis, because the economic uncertainty is taking place during, not after, a power transition period. Desperate for cash, Hyun believed North Korea would sell nuclear technology to potential buyers. North Korea desired to be a "strong state," ideologically, militarily and economically. Nuclear power would allow two of the three: ideological and military strength. The role of the DPRK Foreign Ministry diminished after Kim Gae-kwan failed to "deal with the United States." The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) remained a source for cash for the DPRK; it was also a potential window of opportunity for inter-Korean cooperation, and at the same time a potential political liability for both Koreas. Hyun believed North Korea after KJI's death would look very different than the current state and require economic assistance from South Korea and the United States. Hyun also underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK cooperation and believed a unified Korea should be nuclear free. END SUMMARY. -------------------------- KJI's Heath and Succession -------------------------- 2. (C) While KJI's overall political power remained "firm and strong," his health was weakening, Hyun said. South Korean analysts believed that KJI was unlikely to live more than 3 to 5 years, although he seemed to be doing better lately. MOU had not discovered any firm basis for rumored pancreatic cancer, reports of which stemmed from a Japanese press article with a Beijing source. Wang Jiarui, Director for PRC Communist Party International Liaison Department, told Hyun that when he had met with KJI in January, Wang could not detect any scars on KJI's head from his widely reported surgery after suffering a stroke. Also, KJI did not look as though he would die soon when he attended the 15-year commemoration of the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, on July 8. KJI remained for the entire duration of the celebration -- over three hours -- and met with his staff for about 20 minutes after the event. 3. (C) Hyun observed that the current, "rushed," pace of succession preparation in the North was noteworthy. "Semi-officially," Hyun said, the transition had started, with some power and authority already transferred to the youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who had already been recognized publicly as a "young commander" and a "brilliant star." The current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-October, was to provide a boost to a smoother transition. Hyun said he expected further nuclear and/or missile tests in October; perhaps, after that, North Korea would return to the nuclear talks. -------------------------------- Return to Dialogue After October -------------------------------- 4. (C) Hyun said it was only a matter of time before North Korea returned to the nuclear talks; the only question was when. North Korea faced a severely degraded economy, serious food shortages, and a shortage of foreign currency. It could resist for a while, but not for a long time. The Five Parties, therefore, should focus on how to manage the return of North Korea to the negotiations. If the return was not well managed, there would be poor results. The United States and South Korea must apply patience and pressure. -------------------------------- The Current State of North Korea -------------------------------- 5. (C) According to Hyun, North Korea now faced a very difficult economic situation, similar to the conditions in 1996 and 1997. Hyun pointed out that North Korea "produces nothing" and had "no meaningful trade" with the outside world. On food, Hyun said that North Korea was now asking private ROK entities for food assistance. Hyun confirmed that the ROKG did not send food aid or fertilizer to the DPRK from 2008 to present. Having also refused U.S. food aid, the DPRK was severely suffering, and the food situation would not improve soon, Hyun said. Since early July, North Korea had suffered from unusually heavy rainfall, which would have a devastating effect on the harvest this year. 6. (C) On inter-Korean trade, Hyun cited data from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), which showed a sharp decrease in inter-Korean trade over the past six months. Moreover, inter-Korean projects such as Mt. Kumkang and Kaesong city tours, major sources of cash, had dried up completely because they were closed in July and December 2008. The remaining, legitimate, cash flow for the North is now the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), from which the North receives about USD 35 million for its 40,000 workers. Hyun believed that North Korea could, and would, sell nuclear technology, and even plutonium. 7. (C) Hyun assessed that Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests were to earn "one big deal" with the United States. North Korea wanted to be recognized as a nuclear state. North Korea's goals were to become ideologically, militarily, and economically a strong state. Aiming to achieve "strength" in all areas by 2012, the year when North Korea will "enter the gateway to become a strong and prosperous nation," according North Korean schedule. Hyun said the ideological goal was already achieved through Kim Il-sung's Juche, or self-reliance, ideology. The DPRK's aim to become a military power was "nearly achieved," through the North's nuclear and missile capabilities. In North Korea's view, ideological and military strength would come from becoming a nuclear power. When North Korea would "gain strength" on all three fronts, it would also obtain the recognition and respect from the rest of the world. ----------- Key players ----------- 8. (C) Hyun identified Jang Sung-taek as the central figure in North Korea at the moment, probably the second-in-command. However, Jang did not oversee serious military issues, including nuclear and missile programs. On military issues, key authority was held by the National Defense Committee. Among the committee members, Hyun said Joo koo-chan was responsible for the rocket launch, and Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were key decision makers within the military. Other National Defense Committee members, such as Cho Myung-rok, who had met President Clinton, were not doing well because of old age. Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were also old, but remained active. According to Hyun's sources, Kim Young-choon suffers from bad hearing, but remained one of KJI's close confidants. Apparently, KJI called for Kim Young-choon twice on July 8, at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of KIS's death -- a clear sign of influence. Hyun also identified Kim Jeong-gak as "very powerful," but underscored that KJI still controls "everything, including the military." ----------------------------------- Diminishing Foreign Ministry's Role ----------------------------------- 9. (C) In the past, the DPRK Foreign Ministry enjoyed some of influence and power, as a check-and-balance element of the DPRK regime. Currently, that balance system has broken down and the foreign ministry's role has diminished considerably. One reason for this downfall, according to Hyun, was the perceived failure of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) where Kim Gye-kwan did "not deal with the United States successfully." Hyun said that the North Korean authorities expected a lot from Kim Gye-kwan, but he had "failed to deliver." ------------------------------- Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) ------------------------------- 10. (C) Hyun saw the KIC as a window of opportunity for inter-Korean development, especially in introducing South Korean capitalism to the North. Run by South Korean managers and machines, the KIC provides glimpse of the South Korean way of life to over 40,000 North Korean workers and their external families. The workers' change in appearance and way of thinking was visible, Hyun said. The 40,000 KIC workers could spread the South Korea's way of life to their families, thus directly affecting some 150,000 people around Kaesong city. Hyun also noted that, the KIC was a divisive issue in South Korea too. The North could use KIC to "divide" the South, Hyun assessed, but still, Hyun said, most of South Korea, including the ROKG, did not want the project to fail. ----------- Way forward ----------- 11. (C) Hyun believed North Korea after KJI's death would look very different, requiring considerable economic assistance from South Korea, the United States and international community. Hyun advised that in case of a sudden collapse in North Korea, the ROKG and USG should move quickly toward unification of the Korean peninsula. There was "no disagreement" among ROK agencies on this point, Hyun said. The USG could expect "full cooperation" from the ROKG; unification was the goal of South Korea. Hyun underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK cooperation and stated that a unified Korea should be nuclear free. 12. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001241 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Tokola. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Berman, welcome to Korea. The alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is strong, enduring, and strategically important. Your visit follows the successful June 16 U.S.-ROK Presidential Summit and adoption of the Joint Vision Statement. The Joint Vision Statement was well-received here, both for its recommitment to a continued strengthening of our security relationship (including its affirmation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence to the ROK), and for outlining what a 21st century U.S.-ROK relationship entails. To realize this vision, we will need to continue to expand our cooperation, both regionally and globally. Security in the region, particularly in view of North Korea,s continued belligerent posture and Kim Jong-Il,s declining health, is important to Korean officials. Like us, the ROK supports the Six Party Talks and remains adamant that we should not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. Your South Korean interlocutors are very interested in how you view the proposed North Korean contingency plan, and prospects for denuclearizing North Korea. 2. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in Washington. Ratification of the FTA is seen as a sign of America's strategic commitment in northeast Asia. President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in late April. A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington. The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature of their concerns, and to develop recommendations for addressing them. To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA. End Summary. ---------- BACKGROUND ---------- 3. (C) The ROK, with its vibrant democracy, free market, high-tech economy, highly educated population, free press, and ever-deepening people-to-people ties with the United States, is a striking success story, including for U.S. foreign policy. Our intensive engagement with the ROK since its founding in 1948 exemplifies the importance of all three pillars Secretary Clinton has outlined describing U.S. foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. South Korea's success is based on a shared commitment to defense, as shown by the 28,500 U.S. troops still on the Peninsula, the substantial development assistance the U.S. provided after the Korean War, and our close diplomatic cooperation to achieve a denuclearized North Korea and a more secure and prosperous future for the region. 4. (C) Now a developed country with a tested democratic system, South Korea increasingly has the capability as well as the political will to assume larger regional and global roles. Your visit will encourage your interlocutors to become even more active partners with us on issues ranging from human rights promotion to climate change to sea piracy to counter-terrorism. We share values and strategic goals with this highly capable ally; we need to give substance to our shared aspiration to upgrade our bilateral relationship, making it a global partnership. ---------------------- The Domestic Situation ---------------------- 5. (C) President Lee, of the center-right Grand National Party (GNP), began his single five-year term in February 2008, ending ten years of center-left control of the Presidency. In April 2008 the GNP won a solid majority over the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) in the unicameral National Assembly. The GNP's success at the polls, however, belied the lack of consensus among the South Korean public on domestic political issues like media law reform, labor relations, tax policy, and education. President Lee has struggled with low approval ratings -- about 30 percent -- since taking office, especially following his decision to re-open the Korean market to U.S. beef last year. In the National Assembly, the GNP and DP have even lower approval ratings than President Lee, resulting in a virtually deadlocked domestic agenda. 6. (C) President Lee has remained publicly disengaged from the squabbling in the National Assembly and is focusing instead on foreign policy, resource diplomacy, and international cooperative efforts on green growth, climate change, and overcoming the economic crisis. He campaigned on a pledge to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, and is widely seen as having been successful. With China and Russia, he has substantially expanded the ROK's economic and political ties. He has attempted to overcome historical animosities with Japan to advance Korea-Japan ties based on Korea's pragmatic interests, but sensitivities to Japan's colonization of Korea run deep. Looking wider, President Lee is actively cultivating new ties with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe. 7. (C) Former President Kim Dae-jung's health has been failing and he is currently hospitalized in Seoul in intensive care. The prognosis for President Kim, who was in office 1998-2003 and who is 84, is not good. ------------ The Alliance ------------ 8. (C) For over half a century the U.S.-ROK alliance has provided the foundation for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The ROK has benefitted greatly; neither the economic "Miracle on the Han" nor Korea,s democratic flowering would have been possible absent a U.S. defense shield and economic assistance and support. The U.S. too has benefited. USFK (U.S. Forces in Korea) is our only troop presence in mainland East Asia, and South Korea contributes billions of dollars to USFK operating expenses. 9. (C) The Summit Joint Vision Statement offers a compelling vision of expanding the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance regionally and globally. On the Korean Peninsula, we are also working to strengthen, further broaden, and appropriately evolve the security relationship by implementing three key bilateral transformation agreements known as YRP, LPP and STP. -- YRP: The Yongsan Relocation Plan will relocate the headquarters of U.S. Forces (USFK) from the middle of Seoul to a new, purpose-built war-fighting headquarters south of the city, thereby giving back to the Koreans a large tract of land historically associated with Japanese occupation which they plan to turn into a central park. Progress on the implementation of YRP continues but construction to prepare U.S. Army Garrison ) Humphreys, the hub for the relocation, continues on schedule but faces obstacles that require President Lee,s and his administration,s support if we are to meet the agreed 2014 completion date. -- LPP: The Land Partnership Plan will consolidate over 100 U.S. military bases spread all across Korea into two key strategic hubs south of the Han River, replacing an outdated military footprint from the end of the Korean War with a modern and better-positioned force posture. The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) seeks to complete the LPP by the end of 2015. -- STP: The Strategic Transition Plan is the process under which we are transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from the U.S. military to the ROK military by April 17, 2012. President Lee has emphasized the need to keep the spotlight off of wartime OPCON transition due to increased scrutiny by ROK domestic opposition groups regarding the April 17, 2012 transition date (in the wake of North Korea,s recent claimed nuclear test). We are continuing to emphasize the process for close cooperation in reviewing OPCON transition progress through the SCM and management of messaging and public perceptions to highlight the value of the restructuring. 10. (C) We must continue to emphasize the importance of completing the two relocation elements of USFK transformation, YRP and LPP. Those agreements, signed in 2004, did not come with appropriated funds. The Master Plan, finished in 2007, lays out the cost and timeline but the ROKG has yet to request funding from the National Assembly. Other U.S. and ROK private sector initiatives are failing to fill the funding gap. As a result, alliance transformation, which was originally scheduled for completion in 2008, is facing a delay of many more years. To avoid further delays, the ROKG must make implementation of these moves a priority. For our part, we must be clear and consistent in identifying our own top priorities . 11. (C). The time is right to expand the areas in which the U.S. and the ROK cooperate on global security issues. You may want to raise the following areas where the ROK may be ready to increase its global security role: -- Afghanistan: The ROKG is planning to provide more assistance and training in Afghanistan, including building a new hospital and a training center in Bagram, and contributing ambulances, motorcycles, and police trainers. However, we need a lot more from the ROK, especially financial support for the Afghan Army, for which we have requested USD 100 million a year for five years, which is the USG primary request of the ROK. The ROKG also is considering sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan, which we would welcome, but we also have insisted that any such PRT include a military unit to provide for its own security. Such a deployment (the PRT as well as any other military assets, such as an ISR unit ) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) will need National Assembly approval, which will pose difficult, but not insurmountable, political problems for President Lee. -- UN Peacekeeping Operations: The National Assembly is deliberating on a bill that will allow the ROK military to be deployed for peacekeeping missions without prior legislative approval. In the meantime, the National Assembly in July approved extending the ROK,s PKO deployment in Lebanon until the end of December 2010. The ROK has contributed 367 soldiers for peacekeeping in Lebanon since 2007 and is participating in eight other PKO operations around the world. As of January 1, 2008 the ROK was the 10th largest provider of assessed contributions to the UN PKO budget. -- Combating Piracy off Somalia: The ROK is a member of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Additionally, the ROKG deployed a 4,500 ton class destroyer equipped with a Lynx helicopter and rigid inflatable craft to the Gulf of Aden to be part of the maritime security operations of the combined maritime forces. The destroyer carries up to 310 personnel. -- Proliferation Security Initiative: In response to the DPRK,s May rocket launch and nuclear test, the ROK on May 26 joined the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In June the ROK participated in a PSI meeting in Poland, and held a workshop in Seoul in July. The ROKG plans to attend the next workshop in Sydney in September, and has expressed interest in attending the interdiction exercises in Singapore in October. PSI is an international, interagency effort aimed at preventing or interdicting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using existing domestic laws and established international agreements. The ROKG currently is formulating an interagency strategy for its effective PSI participation. --------------------------- U.S.-ROK Global Partnership --------------------------- 12. (C) The ROK also wants to play a bigger role on other global issues and the following are good areas for increased cooperation: -- Democracy and Human Rights: The ROK has demonstrated a new readiness to address human rights concerns in the DPRK, co-sponsoring the annual UNGA North Korea human rights resolution in 2008 for the first time. In October 2008 the ROK agreed to chair the first Senior Officials' Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership, a U.S.-supported regional subset of the Community of Democracies. -- Climate Change: Korea, the 13th largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases and the world,s 15th largest economy in terms of GDP, is playing a constructive role in discussions on global climate change. The ROKG shares the U.S. view that that investment in new and renewable energy sources not only can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also can create jobs, spur economic growth, and enhance energy security. The U.S. Department of Energy is engaged in a variety of collaborative R&D activities with Korea, including in nuclear energy, fusion, gas hydrates, "smart grids," and other new and renewable energy technologies, but there is room to expand and strengthen our cooperation. -- Development Assistance: Korea's overseas development assistance program currently includes nearly USD 500 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA), as well as a roughly similar figure for North Korea (suspended). The ROKG target is to triple ODA (as a percentage of GDP) by 2015. With limited functional and regional capacity, Korea should be receptive to policy discussions on ODA coordination. -- Counter-Proliferation: The ROKG has told Iranian counterparts at every opportunity that Tehran's uranium enrichment activities are unacceptable and has supported the P5-plus-1 incentives package. ----------------------- FTA and Economic Issues ----------------------- 13. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in Washington. President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in late April. A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington. The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature of their concerns, to develop recommendations for addressing them. To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA. 14. (C) Korea is our seventh largest trading partner, with total merchandise trade in 2008 of over USD 82 billion (and more than USD 100 billion if services are included). The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in September 2007 that U.S. merchandise exports to Korea would expand by USD 10-12 billion on an annual basis as a result of the FTA and that services exports would also expand. The United States has traditionally been the ROK's biggest trading partner in the post-WWII era. One tangible sign of China's growing importance in Asia and in Korea, however, is that China displaced the United States as Korea's top trading partner in 2004. By 2008, China-ROK merchandise trade reached USD 168 billion, doubling the U.S.-ROK total. With respect to North Korea, China accounts for nearly 50 percent of that country's total trade. The growing economic and political role of China on the Korean peninsula is one of the most important motivations for Korea to enter into FTA negotiations with the United States. Successive ROK Governments have seen the ratification and implementation of the KORUS FTA as symbolic of the U.S. will to remain fully engaged in Northeast Asia in the face of increasing Chinese influence. 15. (C) Korea also wants to conclude an FTA with the United States because Korean economic reformers recognize that the Korean economy needs to liberalize and open in order to promote greater competitiveness vis--vis China and Japan. South Korea has concluded a number of FTAs and launched negotiations on others since the signing of the KORUS FTA negotiations on June 30, 2007. The ROK has implemented FTAs with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN (except investment). The ROK has concluded negotiations with India and signing is reportedly imminent. Negotiations are underway with Canada, Mexico, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, New Zealand, and Peru. In July, the ROKG announced that negotiations on the EU-Korea FTA were concluded (but the agreement is not yet signed). ROK media have been filled with stories of the increasing economic weight of Europe in Korea as a result of the FTA. The Board of Governors of the American Chamber of Commerce has expressed concern that the EU-Korea FTA will disadvantage the competitiveness of U.S. firms vis--vis their European competitors in Korea. 16. (C) The reopening of the beef market was accomplished in an April 2008 agreement separate from the FTA. Under this agreement, the United States and Korea agreed to reopen Korea,s market to U.S. beef and beef products in a manner fully consistent with international standards and science. In June 2008, following massive street protests in Seoul, U.S. beef exporters and Korean beef importers reached a temporary commercial agreement to only export beef and beef products from cattle under 30 months of age, as a transitional measure, until Korean consumer confidence improves. While beef sales have not yet returned to past levels due to Korea,s currency exchange fluctuations, increased competition from Australian beef, and lingering public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, the market is open and we expect increased sales over the medium term. Korea is also watching closely our ongoing negotiations with other countries that have stricter restrictions on U.S. beef. 17. (C) On the global financial reform discussions, Korea is a strong ally in the G-20 process (which it will chair in 2010). Korea is enthusiastic about the G20 as the global forum for action on the global financial system. The ROKG is concerned that European countries are advocating other formulas for such discussions that would exclude Korea. Within the G20, President Lee has called for a strong fiscal response and refraining from protectionism as well as necessary regulatory improvements. President Lee Myung-bak has strongly argued that it would be premature to withdraw the national fiscal stimulus packages at this juncture. Korea sees itself as lining up on the U.S. side on almost all G20 debates. 18. (C) The Korean economy is looking better and is increasingly forecast to be one of the first major economies to emerge from recession. The benchmark KOSPI stock index in early August reached the highest level since mid-August 2008 and the won, the Korean currency, closed at 1218 per dollar on August 4, the strongest level since October 14, 2008. Most analysts foresee further strengthening of the won in the months ahead. The picture looked far different last fall, when the financial crisis hit Korea hard. A USD 30 billion swap line extended by the U.S. Federal Reserve in October, as the Korean won was plummeting and Korea looked to be on the brink of a financial panic, helped Korea weather the worst of the storm, and gained tremendous gratitude. The later Japanese and Chinese swap mechanisms did not have the same impact. In the closing months of 2008 Korea experienced dramatic contraction of demand for its exports. The ROKG's stabilization and stimulus packages mitigated the impact and the weakened currency has generated a significant current account surplus in recent months. Sectors of the Korean economy facing restructuring challenges include construction, shipbuilding, shipping and automotive. GM Daewoo, GM,s Korean subsidiary, is negotiating with the Korea Development Bank for a sizeable loanto restructure its operations. ----------- North Korea ----------- 19. (C) Presidents Obama and Lee agreed to send a clear message to North Korea that its provocations come at a price. They also agreed on principles to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, including commitments to achieving the "complete and verifiable elimination" of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well as the ballistic missile program. Korean officials continue to seek assurances that the United States will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the United States will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. 20. (C) North Korea policy is almost always the most sensitive issue on the South Korean agenda. Fifty-five years of alliance notwithstanding, the ROKG still fears being left out or surprised by Washington's initiatives or policy changes on North Korea. Simply put, the ROKG must be seen by South Koreans as being informed and consulted on all USG moves on North Korea. Korean officials see Washington and Seoul as partners in forming and implementing policies toward the North and consistently seek affirmation that Washington will not allow Pyongyang to drive a wedge between us. 21. (C) There is virtually no chance of early improvement in South-North relations; President Lee is determined to stick to principle and to insist on a more reciprocal relationship with the North, and Kim Jong-il will not give in for his own domestic reasons. Importantly, South Koreans appear tired of, but not particularly bothered by, the continuing threatening rhetoric from the North, and therefore seem largely comfortable with their government's stance. Heightening tensions in the West Sea and missile launches have created less public anxiety than might be expected. The ROKG will welcome the opportunity to present with you a united front of calm and determination toward the North, combined with a call to return to the Six- Party Talks. 22. (SBU) The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the only remaining joint economic project between North and South Korea. (The other joint venture, Mt. Kumkang tours, was closed on July 11, 2008, after North Korean security forces shot a South Korean tourist to death.) Located in North Korea, six miles north of the DMZ, the KIC opened in December 2004 and is home to 106 ROK-owned factories employing approximately 40,000 North Korean workers (84 percent are women age 20-39). Since late 2008, North-South tensions regarding the KIC have increased. The DPRK closed the border temporarily on multiple occasions, and has placed limits on the number of South Korean employees allowed in the KIC. The DPRK is demanding drastically higher wages for employees (up from USD 55 to USD 300 per month), construction of additional dormitories and an additional fee of USD 500 million for land usage. 23. (SBU) North Koreans detained a South Korean Hyundai Asan employee working at KIC on March 30, accusing him of defaming North Korea and attempting to suborn a North Korean female worker. In addition to securing the release of the ROK citizen, South Korea's priorities at the KIC include guaranteeing employee safety, freedom of access and border-crossing, and increasing the number of North Korean workers brought in from outside the Kaesong area. Although the South Korean firms at KIC are concerned about the current tension and complain of financial losses, only one company has withdrawn from KIC to date. 24. (SBU) The DPRK and the ROK have held four rounds of negotiations between April and July 2009 without any breakthrough, with the most recent session taking place on July 2. Both sides appear to be committed to continuing KIC operations. The United States has consistently supported North-South dialogue and expressed hope that the two sides will resolve their disputes over the KIC. -------- VWP/WEST -------- 25. (U) The ROK was included in the the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) in October 2008. This step has been a success in facilitating travel and improving people-to-people ties between nations. As of the beginning of July, approximately 200,000 Koreans had applied for VWP approval using the ESTA (Electronic Approval for Travel Authorization). More than 99 percent of the ESTA applications have been approved and we continue to see an upward trend in ESTA usage. 26. (U) The WEST (Work, English Study, and Travel) program, inaugurated in March 2009, allows qualifying college students and recent graduates to enter the U.S. for up to 18 months on J-1 exchange visitor visas that allow them to study English, participate in professional-level internships and travel independently. A group of 185 Korean students have already travelled to the U.S. on the WEST program and a second wave of 159 is preparing to depart. As of December 2008, there were 110,000 South Koreans studying in the U.S. at all levels, from elementary to graduate school. According to Korean Ministry of Education data for 2007, 27% of all post-graduate students choosing to study abroad chose to study in the U.S. --------------- The Bottom Line --------------- 27. (C) South Korea is a like-minded, energetic partner that is ready, prepared, and wants to have a broader and deeper alliance with the United States. Koreans would like the alliance to be a lot more than a security arrangement. Yes, they want more say, even a more equal relationship, but this is only part of their motivation. Rather, they see that their ties with the U.S. are deeper now than ever; witness, for example, the two million-strong Korean American community, and the enormous numbers of Koreans studying in the United States. Above all, however, a very large majority of South Koreans are convinced that the ROK and the United States have shared values and shared strategic interests. It's time to take the relationship to a new level of global partnership, even as we deepen our cooperation on the Korean peninsula. ------------- Your Meetings ------------- 28. (C) You are scheduled to meet with President Lee Myung-bak, National security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, Speaker of the National Assembly Kim Hyong-o, and Chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee Park Jin. Likely topics of discussion include: -- North Korea: Your interlocutors may seek assurances that the U.S. will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the U.S. will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. -- U.S.-ROK Alliance: Your interlocutors may stress the importance of the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Korean peninsula. -- Global Partnership: Your interlocutors may gauge your level of interest in ROK contributions to reconstruction and stabilization of vital countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan; ROK peacekeeping in Lebanon; and anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. -- FTA: Your interlocutors will seek your views on the prospects for Congressional approval of the agreement. The Trade Minister will stress that the FTA represents a balance of American and Korean interests and that the ROKG cannot re-negotiate the text of the FTA. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Friday, 07 August 2009, 10:51 S E C R E T RANGOON 000502 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, PACOM FOR FPA EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019 TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BM SUBJECT: (S) BURMESE OFFICIAL CONFIRMS BURMA-DPRK "PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR COOPERATION Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 1. (S) Australian Ambassador to Burma Michelle Chan informed CDA that XXXXXXXXXXXX told her the Burma-DPRK connection is not just about conventional weapons. There is a peaceful nuclear component intended to address Burma's chronic lack of electrical power generation. When Chan cited reports of a Burma-Russia agreement for development of a peaceful nuclear reactor, XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that the agreement with Russia is currently just for "software, training." The DPRK agreement is for "hardware." XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed reports Burma's Army Chief of Staff (third highest ranking) General Thura Shwe Mann visited the DPRK last November. Asked why Thura Shwe Mann, XXXXXXXXXXXX responded, "Because he is in charge of all military activities." XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly seemed surprised that the West might be concerned by a Burma-DPRK "peaceful" nuclear relationship. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that, after all, given sanctions, Burma really has "no other options" but to develop the relationship wi th North Korea. Comment ------- 2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX DINGER ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Thursday, 13 August 2009, 08:54 S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000234 STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K; NSC FOR JEFF BADER EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2034 TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KNNP, MG SUBJECT: MONGOLIA'S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S) Summary: On August 12, Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee briefed poloff on the annual Mongolia-DPRK consultations that concluded on August 11. MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar led the Mongolian side, and the North Koreans met with President Elbegdorj on the sidelines of the consultation. Sukhee noted DPRK delegation head Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il spent much time on the nuclear issue and little on the bilateral relationship with Mongolia. Key themes on the part of the DPRK were the lack of criticism of the United States, indications that the DPRK is seeking bilateral talks with the USG on normalization of relations, that the recent travel of former President Clinton to Pyongyang has greatly improved the prospects for such talks, that Mongolia would be an appropriate venue for these talks, and that the Six Party Talks are no longer an option. End Summary. 2. (S) Poloff met with MFAT Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee on August 12 to discuss Mongolia's annual bilateral consultations with the DPRK. Sukhee was present at the consultations and has been involved with Korean affairs as a diplomat since 1985. Sukhee was candid in his meetings with poloff, referring repeatedly and openly to his handwritten notes from the DPRK consultations. ------------------------------------------- DPRK DELEGATION OFFERS NO CRITICISM OF U.S. ------------------------------------------- 3. (S) Sukhee indicated that VFM Kim met with MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar for the consultations and also held a separate meeting with President Elbegdorj on the margins Monday. The Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister was to lead this latter meeting but was unable due to an obligation. Sukhee said the meetings were notable for several reasons: the DPRK delegation did not read from a prepared script, they were not aggressive and made no criticism of the United States, and they criticized China and Russia "three or four times" for supporting recent UN Resolutions aimed at the DPRK. What follows in paras 4 through 12 is Sukhee's description to poloff of the DPRK's statements during the course of the consultations: ---------------------------- DPRK VFM ON DENUCLEARIZATION ---------------------------- 4. (S) VFM Kim said the DPRK is spending too much on weapons rather than on its children, but that the current reality dictates that they cannot get away from weapons for now. Kim said the DPRK is not a threat and was only interested in self-protection. The Mongolian side expressed concern that a nuclear DPRK could lead to a nuclear ROK, Japan, Syria, and Iran, and urged that the Mongolian nuclear-free model could serve as an example. Kim stated the United States would not allow Japan or the ROK to go nuclear and that the DPRK is committed to peace and denuclearization. 5. (S) The Mongolians offered the example of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, when the two allowed for nuclear inspections, leading to improved trust and a reduction in the number of warheads. The Mongolians stated that if they were in the DPRK's place now, they would allow inspections, which would lead to mutual confidence and improved relations. The DPRK side offered no reaction to the suggestion. 6. (S) The DPRK side said what is most important is for the United States and the DPRK to come up with a "common language," a "non-aggression agreement," and establishment of diplomatic relations. Kim stated if the sides can take such measures, then denuclearization will be possible and easy, and that relations with Japan and the ROK will normalize thereafter. 7. (S) The Mongolian side counseled that recent "provocations" (this is Sukhee's word to poloff; another word may have been used in the consultations) such as the missile test meant that the present situation was very fragile, and that the DPRK should be careful not to present the wrong signal. Kim agreed that the DPRK must be careful and must build confidence. The Mongolians stated that even if one has peaceful intentions, one can be seen as provocative. -------------------------------- ON BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE U.S. -------------------------------- 8. (S) Regarding former President Clinton's recent travel to the DPRK to secure of the release of the two journalists, Kim said this action had been prepared for a long time, meaning the groundwork for such a visit was already in place because of the progress the United States and the DPRK made during the Clinton presidency. Kim said forward motion stopped during the Bush Administration but was now able to proceed because of President Clinton's recent involvement in a personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same party, and because former First Lady Clinton is now the Secretary of State. The North Koreans were expecting a dialogue with the United States to start soon as an extension of President Clinton's visit. 9. (S) Kim asked the Mongolians to support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue (Sukhee described Kim as "enthusiastic" at this point), and he stated "there are no eternal enemies in this world." ---------------------- ON THE SIX PARTY TALKS ---------------------- 10. (S) Kim took a "very hard line" on the Six Party Talks according to Sukhee, stating that the DPRK will never return to the talks, that the talks were dead, but that the door has not closed on an opportunity for negotiations. During discussion of the Six Party Talks, Kim criticized Russia and China for their support of recent UN resolutions aimed at the DPRK. Kim said Japan and the ROK were natural allies of the United States during the talks, and that Russia and China ended up supporting the other three, so that the DPRK felt it was five against one. Kim stated the real intention of the Six Party Talks was to destroy the DPRK regime, and that at present the DPRK wants to talk only to the United States. ------------------------------------------ VFM KIM'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ELBEGDORJ ------------------------------------------ 11. (S) Sukhee also provided insight into Kim's meeting with Elbegdorj on August 10: Kim refrained from criticizing the United States and stated the DPRK would be happy if the GOM could support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue "in the international arena." Kim said to Elbegdorj, "We are telling you all this because Mongolia understand us." Kim reiterated the notion that there is a "good personal understanding" between former President Clinton and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il. -------------------------------------- HOW ABOUT U.S.-DPRK TALKS IN MONGOLIA? -------------------------------------- 12. (S) Sukhee further noted that a counselor named Choi from the DPRK Embassy in Ulaanbaatar told Sukhee on the way to the airport on August 11 that he had suggested to VFM Kim that it would be good to host U.S.-DPRK talks in Mongolia, but that Kim offered no reaction. Choi also told Sukhee that the timing was right to establish a regional security mechanism whose organization the Mongols should spearhead. MINTON ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001400 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI ECON KN KS SUBJECT: INTER-KOREAN RED CROSS TALKS ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4(b/d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: The North Korean delegation to the August 26-28 inter-Korean Red Cross talks showed up armed with instructions from Kim Jong-il (KJI) to agree immediately to family reunions by Chusok (Korean Thanksgiving, October 2-3), but was not prepared to negotiate additional reunions. Ministry of Unification (MOU) xxxxx that, angling for food assistance, the DPRK delegation asked whether the ROKG brought a "gift," the ROKG responded that such aid would be premature. In a separate meeting, an MOU official described the mechanics of the family reunion process, noting that the DPRK gathered its participants in Pyongyang for a month of fattening up and indoctrination prior to the family reunification. END SUMMARY. --------------------------------------------- ------------ KJI: Green Light for Chusok Deadline, but Nothing Beyond --------------------------------------------- ------------ 2. (C) xxxxx, who recently returned xxxxx xxxxx at Mount Kumgang. xxxxx, a seasoned MOU officer who participated in previous negotiations with the DPRK, said he was surprised that DPRK head delegate Choi Sung-ik was unusually cooperative during this round of talks. Choi, infamous throughout the ROKG for his gruff demeanor and tough tactics, came to the table emphasizing he was authorized by Kim Jong-il (KJI) to "meet the Chusok deadline." The North Korean delegation, however, was not authorized by KJI to discuss anything beyond October. --------------------------- DPRK Asks About Food "Gift" --------------------------- 3. (C) According xxxxx, the DPRK delegation inquired whether the South Korean delegation had brought a "gift," hinting that they were expecting food aid. The ROK delegation responded that it was "premature" for such an arrangement. xxxxx noted that this was a big change, pointing out that during the past 16 rounds of Red Cross negotiations, the ROKG always asked for the family reunions and rewarded the DPRK with rice and fertilizer aid. This time, however, the reunion suggestion came from the DPRK and the ROKG did not, and has no plans to, offer food aid. --------------------------------------------- Atmospherics: Food Shipped in from Pyongyang --------------------------------------------- 4. (C) Addressing atmospherics during the talks, xxxxx said the two sides came to an impasse when the DPRK delegation pushed hard for the resumption of Mount Kumgang tours. They argued that KJI had given his oral guarantee that ROK citizens would be safe and "nothing could be more secure" than KJI's word. The ROK delegation pushed back, asking for a written guarantee. The impasse was broken when the ROK side inquired whether the resumption of Kumgang tours was a prerequisite for the Chusok family reunions; the DPRK delegation said no. (xxxxx added that he suspects some kind of amendment to the 2004 security agreement for Mt. Kumkang tours will be reached in the near future as a compromise. End note.) 5. (C) xxxxx, both delegations took turns hosting dinner for the two nights they spent at Mount Kumgang. He said the hotel and kitchen personnel were hired "in a hurry" from nearby villages and food was shipped in from Pyongyang. xxxxx noted that the ROK delegation was charged USD 50 per person for hosting its 70-person banquet, a price that in fact covered the tab for the banquet hosted by the DPRK delegation the previous evening. ------------ Carrot Time? ------------ 6. (C) xxxxx related that following the Red Cross talks, the ROKG has been reviewing what, if any, "carrots" should be offered to the DPRK for its string of conciliatory gestures. According xxxxx, senior MOU officials recognize that North Korea's goodwill is cyclical, but also want to acknowledge that DPRK has done "all that it could do, except for denuclearization," during the past few weeks. xxxxx said that the ROKG was carefully observing developments in U.S.-DPRK relations and emphasized that Seoul would come up with a position "not too far" from Washington's position. --------------------------------------------- - Potemkin: Fattening Up the Reliable Relatives --------------------------------------------- - 7. (C) xxxxx walked us through the mechanics of what comes next in the family reunion process. xxxxx explained that the two Koreas exchanged a list of 200 names each on September 1; the ROKG picked its families by lottery, the DPRK by political reliability. xxxxx explained that each government would then search for relatives of those on the lists. In the past, he said, about half of the participating ROK families received confirmation from the DPRK that their relatives were alive and were then able to hold unifications. The rest of the ROK families received death confirmations or the ambiguous word "unconfirmed." 8. (C) xxxxx asserted that once the DPRK identifies politically reliable family members to participate in the upcoming reunions, they will be transported to Pyongyang and then "fattened up" with regular meals and vitamins to mask the extent of food shortages and chronic malnutrition in the north. The "lucky" DPRK reunion participants will also be provided with new clothing -- suits for men and traditional Korean "hanbok" for women -- for the televised event. In our earlier meeting, xxxxx had commented that MOU gives "pocket and travel money" to ROK participants which they then pass on to their North Korean relatives. xxxxx sighed that the majority of the MOU cash is usually pocketed by North Korean officials, who also force the North Korean participants to return their new clothes. Tokola ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 26 October 2009, 00:14 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002963 SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA EO 12958 DECL: AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, PARM, PGOV, ECON, ETRA, MNUC, MARR, CH, JP, KN, KS, IR SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE YAFEI, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d). 1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 8:30 a.m.; St. Regis Hotel, Beijing. 2. (SBU) Participants: UNITED STATES Deputy Secretary Steinberg Laura Stone (notetaker) CHINA Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department USA Division Director An Gang (notetaker) Summary ------- 1. (S) Summary: Deputy Secretary Steinberg explained U.S. confidence-building and transparency objectives vis-a-vis Iran that we planned to pursue at the October 1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran Political Directors meeting. VFM He said an MFA Director General-level official would attend for the PRC. He emphasized the importance of sustaining the dialogue, expressed hope that U.S. domestic political pressure would not lead the U.S. to pursue UN sanctions, and affirmed the need for monitoring, supervision and benchmarks. The Deputy Secretary rejected the idea that politics were motivating U.S. Iran policy, and made clear the U.S. position that we need to resolve, not just monitor and supervise, the Iranian nuclear problem. On the upcoming POTUS visit, VFM He suggested that a joint statement reflect the balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship while also addressing each country's "core" interests. He expressed worry that the Copenhagen climate change meeting could overshadow the trip. VFM He welcomed the institutionalized G-20, downplayed the importance of Premier Wen Jiabao's announced October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang, and bemoaned the U.S. 421 tire safeguards decision. End summary. Iran ---- 2. (S) The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives for the October 1 P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting with Iran. He outlined actions in support of the pillars of confidence building and transparency that Iran needed to undertake to establish its seriousness in addressing the nuclear issue. On process objectives, the Deputy Secretary noted that the nuclear issue would need to remain the primary subject in follow-up experts meetings, although other agenda topics were possible. 3. (S) VFM He Yafei said he could not attend the October 1 talks and would send an MFA Director General-level official. Based on Chinese communications with Iran, VFM He said, he thought it would be difficult for Iran to refuse talks, since entering into dialogue was the only way to diffuse tensions. He was less certain about the prospect of Tehran giving up its nuclear program. VFM He asserted that because the weapons program was "not quite there yet" and the facilities were all dual-use in nature, Iran's assertions that the program was for peaceful use were "50-percent true." The key, according to VFM He, was monitoring and supervision, while establishing benchmarks that Iran should not cross. 4. (S) VFM He suggested that the first objective of the October 1 meeting with Iran should be to keep the dialogue alive. He asked that the United States not reject Iranian attempts to broaden the conversation or create the impression that the talks were not making progress. Noting that President Obama had told President Hu Jintao that resolving the Iran situation was a pressing U.S. interest, VFM He asked how long the United States would remain patient in the face of limited progress. He expressed hope that "domestic political pressure" would not lead the United States to seek new UN Security Council sanctions. 5. (S) The Deputy Secretary stated that domestic political factors were not driving our approach to Iran, but rather a BEIJING 00002963 002 OF 002 conviction -- shared by Britain and France -- of the need to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. The nuclear issue needed to be discussed up front in talks; the process could not stay alive without Iran committing to some confidence-building measures. Monitoring and supervision were not adequate, as the North Korean case had demonstrated. POTUS Visit ----------- 6. (C) VFM He asked that the upcoming POTUS visit reflect the balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship, including economic, security, cultural, economic and people-to-people ties. A joint statement should not be too detailed and should instead mirror the status of two of the world's most important leaders. That said, the statement had to address, in a positive way, both countries' "core" interests. VFM He expressed worry that the early-December Copenhagen climate change meetings could overshadow the POTUS visit, and recommended that China and the United States focus during the visit on our respective national commitments in the realm of climate change. 7. (C) VFM He raised his proposal for a "humanities" MOU that would cover people-to-people, cultural, and science and technology exchanges, saying he hoped to make this one of the "gems" of the visit. He suggested that the presidents sign the clean energy and environmental protection MOU. G-20 ---- 8. (C) VFM He thanked President Obama for his leadership in institutionalizing the G-20, which had created a "comfortable" platform for countries like China and India to play a larger role. He explained that there had been some domestic criticism of President Hu's participation in the G8-plus-5. He expressed hope that the United States would coordinate closely with China as we established new rules for the organization, and that it would not become an organization that duplicated the United Nations or the G-8. VFM He expressed reservations about how fast the G-20 could expand to handle issues beyond economics and finance, but noted that if the organization was going to stay relevant for leaders it's scope would have to grow. He specifically mentioned the need for a coordinating mechanism on global diseases and counter-terrorism. North Korea ----------- 9. (S) VFM He downplayed Premier Wen Jiabao's upcoming October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang, stating "we may not like them," but "they (the DPRK) are a neighbor," and the trip was part of the 60th anniversary of relations celebrations. He stated that the Premier would convey a strong message on the need to denuclearize, to come back to the Six-Party talks, and to not abandon the Six-Party Talks framework. He noted that North Korea often tried to play China off the United States, refusing to convey information about U.S.-DPRK bilateral conversations. Clearly seeking a clarification for the record, VFM He asked if the United States were prepared to accept a nuclear-armed but non-proliferating North Korea. The Deputy Secretary stated this was not acceptable or sustainable. Tires ----- 10. (C) VFM He lamented the United States' recent 421 tire decision, and expressed concern that lawyers in the United States were preparing additional cases on products such as textiles. He opined that China and the United States relied too much on "technical" negotiators. 11. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message. HUNTSMAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 26 October 2009, 00:33 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002965 SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA EO 12958 DECL: 09/29/2029 TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, PGOV, PARM, MNUC, CH, KN, KS SUBJECT: PRC: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH STATE COUNCILOR DAI BINGGUO Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1 .4 (b/d). 1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 3:00 p.m.; Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound; Beijing 2. (SBU) Participants: U.S. ---- The Deputy Secretary Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amb. Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Nancy Leou, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker) James Brown, Interpreter PRC --- State Councilor Dai Bingguo Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei Guan Youfei, Ministry of National Defense, Deputy Director, International Office Zheng Zeguang, Director General, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department Zhang Kunsheng, Director General, MFA Protocol Department Yang Houlan, Ambassador for Korean Peninsula Issues Li Song, Deputy Director General, MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department Cong Peiwu, Counselor, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department 3. (S) SUMMARY: In a September 29 meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of persuading Pyongyang to return to the path of denuclearization. Dai said that the U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under the new U.S. administration and urged the two countries to avoid "setbacks." During his recent trip to North Korea, Dai said, he met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il for two and one half hours and Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health. Dai said he had urged Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. Dai's DPRK interlocutors had responded that they wanted bilateral engagement with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on the outcome of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Dai said that Premier Wen's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang would be another opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the nuclear issue. On Iran, Dai said China and the United States had the same objectives but that China would work on Iran in its own way. China believed peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful resolution than sanctions would, and, Dai urged, the United States should be more patient. D responded that patience could not be unlimited in light of Iran's continued enrichment program in violation of UNSC resolutions. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that China and the United States would work together to prepare for President Obama's November visit to China. Dai supported the idea of a "concise and substantive" joint document to be issued in conjunction with the visit. End Summary. Full Strategy to Address North Korea ------------------------------------ 4. (S) The Deputy Secretary met with State Councilor Dai Bingguo for an eighty-minute discussion on North Korea, Iran, and the U.S.-China relationship on September 29. The Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of fashioning a full strategy to address the DPRK nuclear issue and having a unified position among Six-Party Talks partners and allies that would lead to an effective and diplomatic resolution of the problem. He expressed support for Premier Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang and said both countries should work to persuade Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks and to reaffirm the 2005 Joint Statement. The United States was prepared to have meaningful, substantive engagement with BEIJING 00002965 002 OF 004 a senior North Korean official and would use the any bilateral discussion to encourage Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for China's efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1874. U.S.-China Relations on Positive Track -------------------------------------- 5. (S) State Councilor Dai said that President Obama and President Hu had had several opportunities to meet in recent months. After watching the two leaders interact in New York, Dai observed, the two presidents appeared to be "old friends." Dai thanked the U.S. Government for its "careful arrangements" for President Hu's visit to New York, as well as for National People's Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo's recent, successful visit to the United States. Dai expressed appreciation to President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Geithner for their personal contributions in making the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) a great success. Dai was confident that the S&ED would have a positive global impact and confided that China had already begun thinking about the next round. The U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under the new U.S. administration despite some "unpleasant things." Dai urged the two countries to keep up a good momentum in the bilateral relationship and to work hard t o avoid "setbacks." Dai's Visit to Pyongyang ------------------------ 6. (S) Regarding his recent visit to Pyongyang, Dai briefly recounted his two-hour meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. Dai said he was on relatively familiar terms with Kim, because he had met with Kim on several occasions in his previous role as Director of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID). Dai admitted that in contrast with his discussion with Vice FM Kang (see below) his conversation with Kim was not as direct and candid and joked that he "did not dare" to be that candid with the DPRK leader. Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had a "sharp mind." Kim told Dai that he had hoped to invite the Chinese official to share some liquor and wine, but that because of scheduling problems, he would have to defer the offer to Dai's next visit to North Korea. Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being "quite a good drinker," and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol. Kim said yes. Dai said he also met briefly with Kim Yong-nam, President of the Supreme People's Assembly, who invited him to attend the performance of a famous Chinese opera, "The Dream of the Red Chamber." 7. (S) Dai said that he had had frank and blunt discussions with DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju that totaled over two and one half hours. Dai said he told Kang that denuclearization should be Pyongyang's first choice and that it was important for North Korea to return to Six-Party Talks. He had stressed to Kang that the Six-Party Talks mechanism was useful and explained that the ultimate resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue could not be resolved without the participation of the Six Parties. According to Dai, Kang responded that North Korea was still committed to the goal of denuclearization. Dai believed that the North Koreans had not categorically denied the Six-Party Talks and opined that under the right circumstances, it might be possible to revive the Six-Party Talks process. Dai's North Korean interlocutors had emphasized the strong security threat it faced. The North Koreans told Dai that they wanted to have dialogue with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on their conversation with the United States. North Korea held "great expectations for the United States," said Dai. DPRK officials had told Dai that North Korea viewed former President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang positively. 8. (S) Even though he had not had an opportunity to visit or observe any place other than Pyongyang, Dai said, his impression of North Korea was that the domestic situation appeared stable and normal. Dai opined that the DPRK BEIJING 00002965 003 OF 004 appeared focused on two issues: improving its relationship with the United States and developing its economy. U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Engagement ------------------------------ 9. (S) China was aware that the United States was considering possible re-engagement with North Korea and supported U.S.-DPRK bilateral discussions, said Dai. With bilateral dialogue, there was "no limit to how far you could go." China appreciated U.S. understanding and support for Premier Wen's upcoming visit to Pyongyang. President Hu had already informed President Obama of the trip. Dai explained that it would have been "impolite" for China to not reciprocate with a high-level visit to Pyongyang after DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il had visited Beijing in March for the 60th anniversary celebration of Sino-DPRK ties. Wen's visit would provide an opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the nuclear issue, stated Dai. 10. (S) The Deputy Secretary thanked Dai for sharing his perceptions of the North Korea nuclear issue and stressed that President Obama wanted to make clear to the North Korean people and to Kim Jong-il that the United States did not have any hostile intent toward North Korea. The United States was ready to move forward to normalize relations with North Korea if Pyongyang moved toward denuclearization. The Deputy Secretary expressed hope that North Korea would agree to a meeting between Ambassador Bosworth and First VFM Kang Suk-ju to achieve that goal. Iran ---- 11. (S) The Deputy Secretary said the United States valued the joint effort it took to create the P5-plus-1 foreign ministers statement on Iran. He acknowledged that the United States and Iran had a long and complicated history of mistrust. The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives and stressed that all sides had to take confidence-building steps that would lead to a diplomatic resolution. Recent disclosures by Iran underscored the need to deal with the issue urgently, and it was important that Iran give a strong signal during the October 1 meeting that demonstrated it was ready for serious engagement. 12. (S) Dai responded that China and the United States saw eye to eye on the Iran nuclear issue. Nuclear states should reduce their nuclear arsenal with the goal of eventual elimination and should work to prevent other nations, including Iran, from developing nuclear weapons. However, China and the United States had different considerations on how we advanced these goals. With a history of mistrust and mutual suspicion between the United States and Iran, it would not be easy to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. Dai urged the United States to have more patience, address Iran's legitimate concerns, and work to identify and expand on the positive areas in the bilateral relationship. 13. (S) Dai characterized President Obama's policy to resolve issues through dialogue and engagement as "wise." Sanctions might work up to a point, but China believed peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful resolution. Dai warned that pressing too hard might risk antagonizing Iran. Iran was not a small country, it had a long history and culture, and its people were not dumb. Dai urged the United States to resolve the issue in a "smart" manner. One meeting would not be able to resolve all problems, so the United States lower its expectation for the October 1 meeting. China would work on Iran in its own way and would urge Iran to seize the window of opportunity. Dai said China and the United States had the same objective, but said that each country would play a different role in achieving that objective. 14. (S) The Deputy replied that it was Iran that was "impatient" in its ongoing program of uranium enrichment in violation of the UNSC resolutions. The U.S. and the P5 1 would be more willing to be patient in discussions if Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment and forgo its overall? program. This would create an appropriate context for all sides to address underlying issues of concern. BEIJING 00002965 004 OF 004 U.S. National Security Strategy ------------------------------- 15. (S) Noting the Deputy's interest in "strategy" Dai asked whether the Obama administration had an overarching national security strategy. the Deputy Secretary said that the National Security Strategy, which would likely be issued before the end of the year, would articulate the administration's global strategy. He noted that the Secretary had recently identified major themes during her speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, including the importance of global cooperation in confronting today's challenges. In that context, the U.S.-China relationship would play a core role. Dai said he looked forward to reading the strategy paper. President Obama Visit to China ------------------------------ 16. (S) Dai said that President Obama had recently told President Hu that he looked forward to having a "magnificent" visit to China. Asked how China could help achieve this, the Deputy Secretary said the two countries should seek to demonstrate to our peoples and to the international community how the U.S.-China relationship would help address global challenges in areas such as public health, nonproliferation and the environment. The two countries should seek to demonstrate how U.S.-China ties were between the two peoples, not just between the governments, diplomats and leaders. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that China would work with the U.S. to prepare a successful visit. It would be "great," said Dai, if the two sides could agree on language for the joint visit document that would be "concise, as well as substantive." Global Nuclear Security Summit ------------------------------ 17. (S) Asked about U.S.-sought outcomes and goals for the Nuclear Security Summit, the Deputy Secretary explained that President Obama had laid out the three pillars of his nuclear policy during his Prague speech. The Nuclear Security Summit was designed to focus on one of those pillars-the need to safeguard nuclear material against theft or diversion. The risk of proliferation had increased with the expansion of new nuclear power programs and with the existence of unsecured legacy nuclear materials in former Soviet states. We needed to have assurances that the peaceful development of nuclear power programs and nuclear research did not pose proliferation risks. The Same Boat ------------- 18. (S) The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever possible. "If we expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will be larger and more delicious." Together, the two sides should work collaboratively for the good of the world, especially since the two countries were "passengers in the same boat." Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each other's core interests and concerns. 19. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message. HUNTSMAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Tuesday, 10 November 2009, 09:35 S E C R E T RANGOON 000732 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP PACOM FOR FPA EO 12958 DECL: 11/10/2019 TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BM SUBJECT: BURMA: ANOTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT BURMA-DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE REF: RANGOON 502 Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 1. (S) [NAME REMOVED] , who on [DETAILS REMOVED] informed Australian Ambassador Chan in Rangoon that Burma and the DPRK were engaged in "peaceful nuclear cooperation" (reftel), has changed [DETAILS REMOVED] story. In a November 9 conversation with Ambassador Chan, [NAME REMOVED] said there had been a "misunderstanding." After Chan's "blunt" response to the August revelation (Chan had responded with incredulity to the thought that the GOB might consider nuclear cooperation of any sort with the DPRK to be acceptable), [NAME REMOVED] had checked around Nay Pyi Taw. [DETAILS REMOVED] now says GOB-DPRK conversations were merely "exploratory." [NAME REMOVED] cannot confirm any direct nuclear cooperation. [DETAILS REMOVED] added that, in any case, the Kang Nam 1 affair and Secretary Clinton's remarks in Phuket in July "put everything on hold." 2. (S)[NAME REMOVED] observed that Russia is the key GOB partner for a nuclear reactor, but [DETAILS REMOVED] said there has been no progress. Russia has proposed a commercial deal, and the GOB cannot afford it. [NAME REMOVED] added that many countries have relations with the DPRK, including Australia, "so why worry?!" Comment ------- 3. (S) As with many issues in Burma, the truth behind and possible motivations for [NAME REMOVED] first version and the recent revision are difficult to ascertain. Ambassador Chan now believes [DETAILS REMOVED] was simply speculating in August and has corrected the record. We were not in the actual conversations, but to us [DETAILS REMOVED] revision sounds more like an effort to cover a lapse in judgment than to deny the earlier story outright. The comment about the Kang Nam 1 and the Secretary's remarks having "put everything on hold" leave room for concern. That noted, other of [NAME REMOVED] comments have caused us to question just how well plugged in [NAME REMOVED] is on the "nuclear" issue. Bottom line: GOB-DPRK cooperation remains opaque. Something is certainly happening; whether that something includes "nukes" is a very open question which remains a very high priority for Embassy reporting. DINGER ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 11 January 2010, 02:51 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000005 SIPDIS PASS TO EAP/CM, EAP/K, INR EO 12958 DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION TAGS CM, ECON, EFIN, EIND, EMIN, ENRG, PGOV, PINS, PREL SUBJECT: FURTHER INSIGHTS ON PRC-DPRK TRADE: DECISIONS, DISPUTES, AND BACK-DOOR DEALS REF: A. 10SHENYANG 003 B. 09SHENYANG 167 Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman for Reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d) 1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff XXXXXXXXXXXX that Kim Jong-il has recently reversed decisions and struggled to implement policies, showing increasing indecisiveness. XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX also reported that the children of high-ranking DPRK and Chinese officials hijack deals and aid projects for their own aggrandizement. Chinese state electric companies are currently bidding to build the grid for the DPRK's planned large-scale increase in power generation and transmission capacity, but apart from the goal to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, few of the DPRK's other objectives for 2012 will likely be achieved. Construction of the bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju, seems set to begin in 2010, however, China paying for both the bridge and a road on the DPRK side. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that North Koreans having connections and/or money, continue to receive permission to work in Northeast China, despite reports of a recent general recall. End Summary. PROMISING THE MOON TO "THE SUN" ------------------------------- 2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX PolOff met again with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Kim Jong-il has become increasingly indecisive since his stroke and other health problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed to a recent decision to recall students, scholars, and scientists working or studying in China as a result of a single student's defection in Beijing. XXXXXXXXXXXX said business and trade groups with interests in Northeast China had pressured Kim Jong-il to reverse the decision, which he apparently did, and companies in Northeast China are currently developing "positions needing to be filled" to enable those who left the country to get new visas. 3. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, not only does Kim Jong-il decide to reverse policies on his own, but officials also chart their own course as different factions competing for Kim's attention, making it difficult for Kim to set a firm, clear direction. Wary of China's increasing hold on precious minerals and mining rights in the DPRK, many North Korean officials oppose mineral concessions as a means to attract Chinese investment. However, the former Consul General of the DPRK's Shenyang Consulate, in an effort to fund the construction of the plan to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, continues to offer mining and fishing rights to Chinese investors. He attracted more than RMB 12 billion in investment, more than enough to protect himself from the direct attacks of these opponents. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, over-reporting of actual value is a common phenomenon on the part of North Koreans charged with securing foreign investment. For instance, a commitment of RMB 10 million is reported to Pyongyang as a commitment of USD 10 million or more and the actual sum (the RMB 10 million) is reported as a first tranche. After the initial investment is realized, the central government is told that the foreign investor demands further preferences in order to inject more money. The reporting officials count on the central government either taking additional steps to attract the extra investment or doing something to upset the Chinese investor. In the latter case, the official can blame the lack of realizing the investment on political factors out of his control. XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no examples of the DPRK central government acquiescing to the demand for additional concessions. PRC-DPRK INVESTMENT DISPUTES: NOT JUST WITHIN THE DPRK --------------------------------------------- --------- 4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Chinese state-owned enterprises have placed restrictions on investing in North Korea but that a number of privatized Chinese companies in which the state remains a significant shareholder have invested in the DPRK. Disputes with North Korean counterparts develop all the time, XXXXXXXXXXXXnoted. Saying: "It was hard to say" how such disputes are resolved, XXXXXXXXXXXXgave the impression they are seldom, if ever, resolved. Investment disputes related to North Korea also SHENYANG 00000005 002 OF 002 occur between competing investors in China. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, two Chinese companies - Shandong Guoda Gold Company, Ltd. and Zhejiang-based Wanxiang Group - are battling for access to Huishan Copper Mine, the biggest copper mine in the DPRK. Huishan, near the DPRK-China border is rich in gold, silver, and other valuable metals as well. Though MOFCOM approved both joint-venture deals, each company wants to be the sole developer. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes Wanxiang, which has close ties to Premier Wen Jiabao, will likely win out, Shandong Guoda receiving a payment to quietly go away. Without naming names, XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested the strong possibility that someone had made a payment (on the order of USD 10,000) to secure the Premier's support. PRINCELINGS BEHAVING BADLY --------------------------- 5. (S) According toXXXXXXXXXXXX, the children of high-ranking North Korean and Chinese officials hijack the most favorable investment and aid deals for their own enrichment. When the child of a high-ranking official hears of a Chinese aid proposal to North Korea, he will travel to North Korea to convince the relevant official to follow his instructions for implementing the aid project. He will then use his connections to request proposals from Chinese companies to develop the project, returning to North Korea to convince the relevant official to select the favored company. At each step, money changes hands, and the well-connected Chinese go-between pockets a tidy sum. For the offspring of officials in the DPRK, there are also ample opportunities to work in China. In a typical situation, a DPRK official will alert another official to an opportunity for the second official's child to work in China for a DPRK-Chinese joint venture. After signing a contract, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX it is a cheap, easy process to obtain the necessary permit from the Chinese provincial Bureau of Labor and Social Security. He said the system is similar to the "ting xin, liu zhi" system in China in the 1980s, in which officials retained their government position with a suspended salary while going to work for a private company. 6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has seen a number of similarities between the DPRK and China since his first visit in 1998. He compared the impact of the famine on North Koreans to the impact the Great Leap Forward (GLF) had on Chinese in the countryside. Both incidents forced individuals to lose faith in the government's ability to provide a basic standard of living and created a sharp instinct for self-preservation. He also sees similarities between the GLF and current plans in the DPRK to become a strong country by 2012. During his previous meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke of plans to build 100,000 apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. North Korea also plans to increase electricity generation capacity by building coal-fired power plants and hydropower plants, and to increase transmission capacity by extending grids to all secondary cities. Chinese electric companies are currently bidding on the grid projects. Despite the need for increased electricity in North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is almost impossible that North Korea will reach its goals in the next few years. The focus more likely will be on the apartment blocks as these are big, physical things that people can see as a mark of progress. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the long-planned bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju will begin construction next year and that China will pay for the entire project, including a highway on the North Korean side of the border (Ref B). WICKMAN ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Thursday, 14 January 2010, 09:40 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000062 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2030 TAGS PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ECON, KN, KS, CH SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING'S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary ------- 1. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy Robert King, FM Yu downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February; the North Korean leader needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an "increasingly chaotic" situation at home. An unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials had recently defected to the ROK, according to Yu. The foreign minister thanked King for his willingness to press the PRC on the treatment of North Korean refugees. Yu said the ROK would provide "significant" food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK also planned to help fund work by NGOs to combat TB and multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population. At a lunch following the meeting, Seoul's point man on DPRK issues, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, reiterated the FM's call for U.S. help in persuading China to go easier on North Korean refugees. Wi also thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their North Korean kin. End summary. FM Yu on: Prospects for North-South Summit... --------------------------------------------- - 2. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. The ROK was discussing the issue with the DPRK, Yu said, noting that there were two major Blue House preconditions: the nuclear issue had to be on the agenda and the ROK would not pay the North to hold a summit. Yu speculated that it would "take some time" for the North Koreans to "digest" the preconditions. ...Rumors of a KJI Visit to China... ------------------------------------ 3. (C) Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February. The North Korean leader had visited the PRC twice before in that timeframe, Yu related, adding that KJI needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an "increasingly chaotic" situation at home. In particular, FM Yu claimed that the North's botched currency reform had caused "big problems" for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-eun was "not going smoothly." Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasized that the defections have not been made public. End note.) ...Pressuring Beijing on Refugees... ------------------------------------ 4. (C) Yu thanked Ambassador King for stating that he intended to work closely with the ROK on the issue of improving human rights conditions in North Korea. Yu also expressed appreciation for Ambassador King's willingness to engage the Chinese on the issue of North Korean refugees. Yu said he has repeatedly raised the matter with PRC FM Yang, only to get a boilerplate response emphasizing that North Koreans in China are economic migrants. Yu claimed that the number of North Koreans fleeing into China XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to increase; 2,952 North Koreans made it to the ROK in 2009 and more than that are expected in 2010. Yu noted that at least 80 percent of the refugees who come to the South are women, adding that they are often abused by human traffickers. XXXXXXXXXXXX Yu added that he was skeptical that the DPRK would engage in dialogue with the EU about human rights. ...and Humanitarian Assistance to the North ------------------------------------------- 5. (C) Responding to a question from Ambassador King, Yu said the North Korean grain harvest was approximately 4 million metric tons (MMT), which was better than expected but still short of the 4.5 MMT the regime needs to ensure stability. (Note: The official ROKG estimate is that the DPRK harvest was approximately 5 MMT. End note.) Given the North's chronic transportation and storage problems, there would be starvation "here and there" during the spring, Yu lamented. The foreign minister said the ROK would be willing to provide "significant" food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK would not, Yu said, simply give the North a huge amount of grain. Any aid would be given in small amounts, he stressed. The foreign minister also said the ROK would help fund work by NGOs to combat multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population. Follow-On Lunch with XXXXXXXXXXXX -------------------------------- 6. (C) At a lunch following the meeting with XXXXXXXXXX reiterated the FM's call for the United States to XXXXXXXXXXXX 7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their relatives in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea has made only token efforts to support North-South family reunions and has "reacted badly" to Seoul's repeated calls for the release of the approximately 1,000 abductees and POWs believed to be still held by the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that Seoul appreciated Ambassador King's effort to keep the family reunion, abductee, and POW issues on the proverbial agenda. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Thursday, 18 February 2010, 04:57 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000248 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2035 TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, SOCI, KN, KS, CH SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH EXPERTS Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY ------- 1. (C) A group of five ROK opinion leaders and experts on North Korea issues told A/S Kurt Campbell on February 3 it was difficult to predict whether Kim Jong-il's youngest son Kim Jong-un would be able to succeed his father without sparking instability in the North. Of the five experts, one thought the younger Kim might succeed and one argued his lack of leadership experience made it unlikely he would win the support of the ruling elites. They agreed that Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law Jang Song-taek would prove a strong rival for the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge him. Kim Jong-il had used draconian controls and international aid to discourage coups after having foiled three such attempts in the late 90s. China's strategic interests were fundamentally at odds with U.S.-ROK interests in North Korea. End Summary. Succession in Progress but Success in Doubt ------------------------------------------- 2. (C) Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell met on February 3 with Korean opinion leaders with a keen interest in DPRK issues to hear their views on the future of North Korea. The experts agreed that regime succession was fully underway and that the North Korean people had accepted the process. XXXXXXXXXXX said a North Korean diplomat based in Beijing had told him over the phone that morning that the DPRK Foreign Ministry had instructed all of its overseas missions to "lay the foundation for leadership change in Pyongyang." Most of the experts believed the challenge for Kim Jong-il's youngest son and designated heir, Kim Jong-un, would most likely come after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the Chosun Dynasty's 500 year history in which political intrigue and tension might simmer for years, but tended to erupt only after the king died. 3. (C) The group agreed that Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and right-hand man Jang Song-taek was spearheading the succession drive and would be a rival for power once Kim Jong-un's father died, but the group was split on the younger Kim's prospects for holding onto power. XXXXXXXXXXX believed it would be difficult for Jang to wrest power from the younger Kim once the succession process was complete. XXXXXXXXXXX suggested it was unclear whether Jang would be content to control the younger Kim from behind the curtain, or would challenge him directly for outright control. XXXXXXXXXXX Doubts About Younger Kim's Experience ------------------------------------- 4. (C) There were many reasons to doubt that Kim Jong-un would be able to successfully fend off challenges to his control after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX noted that Kim Jong-il had twenty years of experience as an official of the Korean Workers' Party before his father died. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il had the benefit of years of guidance from his father after he had been officially anointed in 1980 to eventually succeed him. By contrast, Kim Jong-un had very limited experience and might not get much direct guidance before Kim Jong-il dies. Even now, XXXXXXXXXXX it was not clear that Kim Jong-il's health was good enough to exercise the faculties necessary for day-to-day management of state affairs. Given the limited opportunity the younger Kim had to gain experience, XXXXXXXXXXX doubted his ability to solidify his position in the Party and win the unwavering support of Pyongyang's power elites. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the tumultuous state of affairs in the ROK following the death of President Park Chung Hee in 1979 and suggested the DPRK succession would be "100 times more troublesome." XXXXXXXXXXX Tight Control and Aid Kept Regime Afloat ---------------------------------------- 5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX opined that brutal repression and international aid had been the secrets of Kim Jong-il's ability to fend off challenges. After three separate coup attempts in the 90s, Kim Jong-il had implemented very strict controls and sent a stern warning to would-be plotters by executing anyone who had been even remotely involved in the plots. Therefore, only the military could even dare consider rising up, but the Security Services had successfully kept the military in check. XXXXXXXXXXXwent on to suggest that the "indulgence" of the international community over the past ten years had also helped sustain the regime. The large-scale assistance provided to the regime by the ROK, China, the U.S., Japan and others had been intended in part to avoid a hard landing, and indeed had kept the regime afloat, he said. [Name removed] suggested that North Korea had skillfully played Washington and Beijing off one another.XXXXXXXXXXX believed that the DPRK had exploited large amounts of assistance from China, taking advantage of a situation in which Beijing was presumed by Washington to have significant influence over Pyongyang. China Complicates the Endgame ----------------------------- 6. (C) The experts agreed that China's obsession with DPRK stability at all costs, was clearly and fundamentally at odds with U.S. and ROK interests. Given a choice between reaching out to Seoul or Beijing, [name removed] believed that Pyongyang elites would reflexively look to China for support if they believed they needed help in maintaining stability. The Seoul option would be unacceptable because of the U.S.-ROK alliance and concerns over becoming subservient to Seoul. China, on the other hand, would gladly provide support with few or no strings attached, just to maintain the DPRK as an independent entity, XXXXXXXXXXX maintained. 7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXnoted that although Washington had a keen interest in both denuclearization and human rights, the U.S. stake in North Korea was minimal compared to that of China by virtue of its proximity to the North. China did not share American perspectives on these two key issues, considering them somewhat abstract. Rather, Beijing was concerned about what it considered to be more concrete issues, such as a potential flood of "economic migrants" and broader social unrest on its immediate border. Reaching the People and Close Cooperation are Key --------------------------------------------- ---- 8. (C) Negating Chinese influence over the long term, [Name removed] observed, would involve close U.S.-ROK cooperation in winning the hearts and minds of the North Korean people. XXXXXXXXXXX STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32 S E C R E T SEOUL 000272 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034 TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary ------- 1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy. Beijing had "no will" to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies -- and the DPRK characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" -- had retained his position as chief of the PRC's 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary. VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations... ------------------------------------------ 2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy; there was "no substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry's "briefing" to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui's visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press release," Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI. 3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX ----------------------------------------- 4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC's delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK "must have lobbied extremely hard" for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China's 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC's XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn't speak English." Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRC's economic rise represented a "return to normalcy" with China as a great world power. ...China's "New Generation" of Korea-Hands... --------------------------------------------- 5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Korea's 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders. ...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario... --------------------------------------------- 6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a "benign alliance" -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could "strengthen the centrifugal forces in China's minority areas." ...and Japan ------------ 7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. Chun asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:54 C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000290 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2030 TAGS PREL, PGOV, SOCI, MARR, ECON, ETRD, KN, KS, CH SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH NSA KIM Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary ------- 1. (C) During a February 3 meeting, National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan told EAP Assistant Secretary Campbell the ROKG wished to have discussions with Washington about delaying the planned transfer of wartime operation control to Korea. Kim agreed that turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks. It was encouraging, however, that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week. NSA Kim asserted that Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance, as the DPRK's internal situation appeared to be significantly more unstable. NSA Kim acknowledged it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Kan. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to "knock on the DPJ's door." President Lee may visit a Korean factory in the United States to help sell KORUS to the American public. Kim suggested that President Obama and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial in Washington to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. Campbell asked for ROK understanding for U.S. plans to resume MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. Kim emphasized that President Lee would never "buy" a summit with Pyongyang. End summary. OPCON Transfer -------------- 2. (C) During a February 3 meeting with Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, ROK National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan said he wished to have discussions with the USG on the planned April 2012 transfer of wartime operation control (OPCON) to Korea. Kim agreed with Campbell's observation that it was important for the Korean public to understand that any change that may be considered concerning OPCON transfer timing, and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, would not diminish America's commitment to the ROK's security, and should not be so interpreted. China Unlikely to Call New 6PT Round ------------------------------------ 3. (C) NSA Kim agreed with Campbell's observation that the current turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks (6PT) anytime soon. Referring to POTUS' upcoming meeting with the Dalai Lama, Kim said the Chinese were "far too sensitive" about the Tibetan spiritual leader's meetings with foreign officials. A few years ago, Kim related, the PRC had crudely pressured the ROK government into canceling a planned speech by the Dalai Lama at a Buddhist conference on Cheju Island. 4. (C) NSA Kim said he was encouraged by reports that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week at the invitation of Chinese 6PT chief Wu Dawei. NSA Kim said he understood Kim Gye-gwan might also visit New York. Campbell noted it was important for the DPRK authorities to hear from the Five Parties that Pyongyang's attempt to shift the focus from denuclearization to a peace treaty was not working. KJI China Trip and Deteriorating Conditions Inside DPRK --------------------------------------------- ----------- 5. (C) NSA Kim asserted that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance. The PRC was in the process of delivering a portion of the food aid promised during Premier Wen's visit to the DPRK last fall; approximately 6,000 metric tons (MT) of rice and 20,000 MT of soybeans has been delivered, but the DPRK needed a lot more. The situation inside North Korea, he added, appeared increasingly unstable. The North's currency replacement had created strong resentment throughout DPRK society, Kim said, adding that DPRK Finance Chief Pak Nam-gi had apparently been sacked. Kim asserted there were credible reports of unrest in the North; according to ROK intelligence sources, DPRK police recently found a bomb on a passenger train en route from Pyongyang to Beijing. U.S.-Japan Relations -------------------- 6. (C) Kim concurred with Campbell's assessment that the DPJ was "completely different" from the LDP and agreed it was important for the DJP to coordinate with Seoul and Washington as it made preliminary overtures to Pyongyang. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to "knock on the DPJ's door." Kim acknowledged Campbell's point that it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Naoto Kan. FTA Prospects ------------- 7. (C) It was the ROK government's view, Kim said, that there might be a window of opportunity to pass KORUS immediately after the U.S. Congressional elections this fall. Kim added that the ROK Embassy in Washington was working on a possible FTA event for President Lee during his upcoming trip to the United States for the nuclear summit. One idea, Kim explained, was to have President Lee visit a Korean factory to help underscore to the American public that the FTA was about creating jobs in America as well in Korea. Campbell praised ROK Ambassador Han Duck-soo for his public outreach on KORUS and noted that the U.S. business community needed to "stop being lazy" and help get KORUS through Congress. Korean War Memorial Visit ------------------------- 8. (C) NSA Kim asked if, during the April nuclear summit in Washington, it would be possible to have POTUS and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial. Campbell acknowledged the powerful symbolism for both the Korean and American audience of such a visit during the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, but cautioned that it would be extremely difficult to arrange during the nuclear summit. MIA Remains Recovery in North Korea ----------------------------------- 9. (C) Campbell asked for ROK understanding about the U.S. position on resuming MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. The USG felt strongly, Campbell explained, that this was an important humanitarian issue. Campbell stressed that the U.S. would coordinate closely with the ROK on the issue to "avoid sending the wrong signal" to the DPRK. Pressed by Kim about paying the North Koreans cash to help recover U.S. remains, Campbell agreed it was distasteful; he noted, however, that the United States had made similar payments to the Burmese and Vietnamese governments to facilitate cooperation on MIA issues. Prospects for a North-South Summit ---------------------------------- 10. (C) On prospects for a North-South summit, NSA Kim clarified remarks that President Lee made in an interview with the BBC in Davos. Kim said that, beginning last fall, the ROK has had contact with the DPRK about a summit. The North, however, has demanded that Seoul provide a certain amount of economic aid prior to any summit. That precondition was unacceptable, Kim stressed, noting that the Blue House had emphasized to the ROK press this week that President Lee would never "buy" a summit with the North. STEPHENS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Friday, 27 August 2004, 08:08 - SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100 SUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE ASSEMBLY AND UNDERGROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN BURMA
- Thursday, 6 July 2006 - 002238 SUBJECT: ROK REACTIONS TO DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES-DAY TWO
- Wednesday, 23 May 2007, 02:45 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 001576 SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SHARES IDEAS ON DPRK INTERACTION
- Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 09:48 - CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001141 SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN, AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL
- Monday, 12 January 2009, 09:12 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 000059 SUBJECT: ROK'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE NEIGHBORS: NORTH KOREA, JAPAN, CHINA AND RUSSIA
- Monday, 27 April 2009, 06:35 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 000672 SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
- Wednesday, 29 April 2009, 13:30 - CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001108 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SIX PARTY NEGOTIATOR URGES PATIENCE ON NORTH KOREA
- Thursday, 30 April 2009, 13:07 - SECRET SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176 SUBJECT: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE DISCUSSES G-20, DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
- Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08 - SECRET SINGAPORE 000529 SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MAY 30, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
- Friday, 24 July 2009, 07:38 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 001171 SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH ROK UNIFICATION MINISTER HYUN IN-TAEK
- Friday, 6 August 2009 - 001241 SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA
- Friday, 07 August 2009, 10:51 - SECRET RANGOON 000502 SUBJECT: (S) BURMESE OFFICIAL CONFIRMS BURMA-DPRK "PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR COOPERATION
- Thursday, 13 August 2009, 08:54 - SECRET ULAANBAATAR 000234 SUBJECT: MONGOLIA'S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM
- Wednesday, 1 September 2009 - 001400 SUBJECT: INTER-KOREAN RED CROSS TALKS ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION
- Monday, 26 October 2009, 00:14 - SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002963 SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE YAFEI, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009
- Monday, 26 October 2009, 00:33 - SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002965 SUBJECT: PRC: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH STATE COUNCILOR DAI BINGGUO
- Tuesday, 10 November 2009, 09:35 - SECRET RANGOON 000732 SUBJECT: BURMA: ANOTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT BURMA-DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE
- Monday, 11 January 2010, 02:51 - SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000005 SUBJECT: FURTHER INSIGHTS ON PRC-DPRK TRADE: DECISIONS, DISPUTES, AND BACK-DOOR DEALS
- Thursday, 14 January 2010, 09:40 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 000062 SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING'S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU
- Thursday, 18 February 2010, 04:57 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 000248 SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH EXPERTS
- Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32 - SECRET SEOUL 000272 SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
- Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:54 - CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 000290 SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH NSA KIM